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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2

-

3

DR. HEYER:

-

-

-

-

Okay, first, it's a pleasure to be

4

here, and since you're probably less interested in what

5

I have to say than what these people have to say, I am

6

going to be brief before turning things over to Bill.

7

I wanted primarily to thank some people, not

8

only the panelists for giving us their time and soon

9

sharing their insights with us, but I wanted to thank

10

particular people at the Antitrust Division who have

11

helped prepare this and helped prepare me.

12

We have some people from the Legal Policy

13

Section in the Antitrust Division, Deputy Chief Gail

14

Kursh, who in an earlier life helped manage the Dentsply

15

case, which you will hear more about from Dr. Reitman

16

over there.

17

Matelis, crackerjack paralegal Brandon Greenland, and

18

most importantly, June Lee, one of the economists in the

19

Division, who, in addition to putting up with all the

20

administrative stuff, has actually contributed

21

substantively.

22

One of the attorneys in her section, Joe

So, with nothing further, I am going to turn it

23

over to my distinguished colleague and co-moderator,

24

Bill Kovacic.

25

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

Welcome to the New Jersey
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1

Avenue Conference Facility on September 26th, the 92nd

2

Anniversary of the adoption of the Federal Trade

3

Commission Act.

4

today and to focus on what I think is one important

5

dimension of the assessment of what standards for

6

unilateral firm behavior ought to be.

7

presumptions that run throughout discussions of doctrine

8

and policy involving the enforcement of competition law

9

against dominant firms derive from empirical judgments

We're delighted to have you all here

Many of the

10

about the state of the world.

11

and see how often the opinions say "we know, it is

12

believed, it is thought, the world is," and then to look

13

futilely in the footnotes for what editors in journals

14

would note and say "Add cite," is a striking phenomenon.

15

To read judicial opinions

More than that, when you take a look at the

16

papers of some of the Justices of the Supreme Court,

17

papers that have become available, you see how

18

frequently in their deliberations they're relying upon

19

hunches, judgments or assessments about the state of the

20

world and the way in which business behavior has been

21

used in the past, and about the significance of that

22

behavior.

23

full range of history and enforcement policy and

24

judicial decision-making, to escape the significant role

25

that assumptions about the state of the world play in

It's impossible, in short, in looking at the

For The Record, Inc.
(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555

6

1

the formulation of doctrine.

2

Our aim today is to address three questions and

3

to try to link empirical work that's been done or might

4

be done in the future to the development of standards.

5

Three questions really animate our session today.

6

The first is to consider what past empirical

7

work tells us about how firms become and remain

8

dominant, to look back and, at least selectively, to

9

take a look at what work has been done by empirical

10

researchers, whether in the form of quantitative work,

11

whether in the form of case studies, whether simply in

12

the examination of the way in which judicial decisions

13

or enforcement decisions have affected the way firms

14

behave.

15

Second, and more forward-looking, is to ask what

16

we would like to learn if we could, what additional

17

facts would we like to have if we could get them in

18

principle.

19

And last, based upon what we offer as an answer

20

to the second question, how might we go about doing it?

21

What combination of effort within public enforcement

22

agencies, among think tanks, academic research centers

23

or other bodies, might provide the means by which

24

important empirical questions could be answered?

25

Later today, as Ken has, I will acknowledge the
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1

many contributions of our professional staff that have

2

made the event possible.

3

to remind you of a couple of housekeeping details about

4

the session.

5

For now, to begin, I just want

The first is to respect our speakers by turning

6

off all of your communication devices.

7

hearing a couple of years ago in the federal courthouse

8

where the bailiff stood up and said, "If your

9

Blackberries or cell phones go off, you will be

10

removed."

11

convention.

12

I was at a

We won't remove you, but please do honor this

Second, those of you who want to make your way

13

to the restrooms, they are through the lobby -- the

14

signs are marked -- between the elevators and off to the

15

right.

16

fire drills and alarms.

17

staff will lead you out to the street, to the right,

18

back through the lobby, and we will simply gather out in

19

front of the building until it is possible to return.

20

Now and then, there are planned or unplanned
If one goes off, we and our

To begin today, we have divided our session into

21

two parts.

We are going to have a series of

22

presentations before we take a break, and then we will

23

have a larger discussion joined by two of our panelists

24

who have agreed to discuss what they have heard and then

25

to add comments of their own about the proceedings.
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1

To get us started is Mike Scherer.

Mike is as

2

renowned and significant a figure in the modern

3

development of economic research and analysis at the

4

Federal Trade Commission as there is.

5

time as Bureau Director in this institution and through

6

his recurring assistance, research and analysis, I think

7

it is fair to say that, in the illustrious collection of

8

those who have served as Bureau Director of the Federal

9

Trade Commission, none has been more distinguished in

10

Going back to his

that very hall-of-fame like collection of individuals.

11

Mike is also well known for the extent to which

12

not simply has he done theory, but one of the reasons we

13

asked Mike to come here is Mike's particular affinity

14

and interest in empirical work and the extent to which

15

empirical work, as well as history and an examination of

16

the past, has figured into his own scholarship.

17

Mike, please, thank you.

18

(Applause.)

19

DR. SCHERER:

20
21

Thank you for those kind words,

Bill.
Let me just briefly address the third of Bill's

22

questions, how to learn.

In many ways, I have been a

23

disciple of Joseph Schumpeter, not the stuff he wrote

24

about monopoly and technological progress, but what he

25

wrote about how economics advances.

Schumpeter argued
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1

that economic analysis was all about three things.

2

was about theory, it was about statistics, and it was

3

about history.

4

all three, and I have tried hard to do all three of

5

those things.

6

bit of an imbalance; in particular, we do too little

7

history.

8
9

It

To do economic analysis right, you need

I think in the profession now there is a

I am not sure whether it was distributed or
whether it is on the web or whatever, but I do have a

10

background paper for the meetings entitled

11

"Technological Innovation and Monopolization."

12

case history of seven great high-tech monopolization

13

cases in the 20th Century, and the thrust of my remarks

14

will be based upon that paper.

15

It is a

Now, first of all, how do you monopolize?

Well,

16

it is pretty well known.

17

strong precedent, so I won't dwell longer.

18

advantages, such as economies of scale, the control of

19

natural resources, network externalities and the like,

20

these are fairly rare except in the traditional

21

regulated industries or in those cases where you define

22

the market very narrowly, as in certain pharmaceutical

23

deals.

24
25

Mergers, here we have very
Natural

The most interesting one is surely superior
efficiency and especially technical innovation.
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10

1

pose the hardest cases for antitrust.

When a firm

2

achieves a monopoly position through superior efficiency

3

or innovation, one faces very difficult trade-offs.

4

should clearly, clearly be encouraging technological

5

superiority, but where is the line crossed?

6

really tough question.

We

That is the

7

A subset of this is patent accumulations.

8

least two of the seven cases I analyzed, that is the key

9

to how firms monopolized, specifically, General Electric

10

in the lamp case and AT&T in the telephone case.

11

not do anything about it early in the century, and

12

therefore, we had a raft of problems to deal with

13

beginning in the 1940s and later.

In at

14

There are some puzzles here.

We did

There is one that

15

I really think the FTC or someone ought to study very

16

carefully, and that's Cisco.

17

position in the network switch business on the strength

18

of about 100 acquisitions and a lot of patent

19

acquisitions.

20

the best market structure for the switch industry if

21

antitrust had intervened against these mergers?

22

Cisco reached its dominant

Was that necessary?

Would we have had

I remember one time being at a cocktail party in

23

Cambridge and meeting a gentleman who told -- you know

24

what you do at these cocktail parties, "What do you do?

25

What do I do?"

He said, "Well, what I have done, I have
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1

developed a switch that is a thousand times faster than

2

anything Cisco has."

3

needless to say.

4

it?"

5

market it."

6

Cisco for a couple of billion dollars.

7

He ran a high-tech startup,

I said, "What are you going to do with

"Oh, we are going to exploit it.

We are going to

The next thing I know, he is bought by

Now, what would have happened if this guy had

8

been encouraged to develop the switch technology on his

9

own?

10
11

These are interesting counterfactual questions

that ought to be explored carefully.
I pass on very briefly to the pricing

12

consequences of monopoly.

13

the theory and the evidence are extraordinarily complex.

14

It depends critically on entry barriers, broadly

15

defined, or cost structures.

16

barriers are low, you have the paradox of explaining how

17

a firm achieved dominance despite having low entry

18

barriers.

19

It has to be brief, because

In particular, if entry

The United States Steel case, decided by the

20

Supreme Court in 1920, bears careful examination.

21

evidence is very clear.

22

a superb job studying that industry.

23

cost advantage over its rivals after the Carnegie

24

properties had settled into normality.

25

cost advantage.

The

The Bureau of Corporations did
U.S. Steel had no

So, it had no

How could it preserve its dominant
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1

position?

2

chose an umbrella pricing strategy.

3

enough to provide nice profits for everybody in the

4

industry.

5

gradually, U.S. Steel's market share declined, which the

6

Supreme Court saw as evidence of effective competition,

7

the declining market share.

8

Well, the answer is it could not, and so it
It set prices high

That encouraged a flood of entry, and

In fact, what it was evidence of was setting

9

prices monopolistically high above the entry-deterring

10

level and behaving essentially sluggishly about entry,

11

and as a result, we have a steel industry that inherited

12

this tradition of sluggishness, of not responding to

13

price signals for 50 years until it got into big trouble

14

in the 1970s and 1980s.

15

Well, much more important than pricing is

16

technological innovation, much more important.

There I

17

am clearly a "Schumpeterian."

18

monopolists, are dominant firms, superior innovators?

19

The theory we have on this -- and we have got a lot of

20

it, and evidence, too -- the theory and evidence on this

21

say there's a duality.

22

situations, situations mainly associated with

23

slow-moving technologies, where the science base is

24

changing slowly.

25

monopolist will, in fact, be a superior innovator, where

The question is, are

On the one hand there are

There are situations where a
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1

only a monopolist is able reasonably quickly to realize

2

sufficient quasi-rents to cover the R&D cost.

3

cases definitely do exist in small markets and markets

4

where the science base is moving slowly.

5

Those

But there's an exception when the science and

6

technology base is moving rapidly, where you have

7

revolutions, the kind of revolution we have had in

8

information technology in the last few decades, where

9

that is happening, and/or when monopolists are reluctant

10

to cannibalize the rents that they are earning on the

11

products that they already have marketed.

12

cases, firms in dominant positions are almost surely

13

sluggish innovators.

14

here, too, one can find exceptions.

15

In those

I say "almost surely" because

The most interesting exception in recent years I

16

think has been Intel.

Andy Grove's book Only the

17

Paranoid Survive is a really nice example.

18

participated for the FTC in the case against Intel and

19

read all of Andy Grove's memoranda for several years.

20

Intel was really terribly alert to new technological

21

challenges and tried hard to stay abreast of them and

22

not be out-competed by upstart innovators.

23

record is quite interesting.

24

projector, and I did not bring a slide anyway -- I

25

forgot to bring it, it was the most important slide I

I

Even so, the

I do not have a slide
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1

was going to bring with me, and I forgot to put it in my

2

portfolio --

3
4

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

We have a sketch artist

in the back.

5

DR. SCHERER:

No, I will wave my arms so you can

6

see.

I did a graph, this was in the FTC's Intel case,

7

from public data.

8

horizontal axis, and on the vertical axis was the speed

9

of microprocessors, and what one sees is two things.

10

First of all, in the period when Intel had a

I had a graph on which time was the

11

monopoly, at least in 32-bit chips, where Intel had a

12

monopoly, the trajectory introducting speed improvements

13

was like this, quite gradual, but then AMD and then

14

Cyrix caught up and got into the 32-bit technology and

15

began competing with Intel, and what you see, that slope

16

abruptly turns sharper.

17

in the key variable of competition, the speed of the

18

microprocessor, and one also found the individual new

19

product points more tightly clustered, showing that more

20

new products were being brought into the market as a

21

result of the competition from AMD and Cyrix.

22

There was more rapid increase

Intel argued in the FTC's case that we are our

23

own best, sharpest competitors, because we have got all

24

this installed base out there, and we have to bring out

25

new products constantly or people will just stick with
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1

their old microprocessors.

2

analyses, and what I found was that using reasonable

3

parameters, Intel would try to maintain a generation for

4

five or six years in the absence of competition.

5

there was competition, however, it moved the speed of

6

the introduction process to two or three years.

7

I did a series of simulation

When

Now, this blends into another aspect where you

8

really have serious problems for antitrust, and that is

9

the so-called fast second strategy.

This is a concept

10

that was introduced in the late 1960s by Lee Baldwin

11

and -- I don't know his first name -- Childs, and there

12

has been a good deal of theoretical development on it

13

since.

14

back until there is a real threat -- Andy Grove's Only

15

the Paranoid Survive -- and then when that threat

16

appears on the horizon, the dominant firm comes onto the

17

market with a new product, with all guns blazing, and

18

perhaps with a whole panoply of practices to make life

19

difficult for the new company.

20

described in the paper I submitted for the record, but

21

you clearly see this kind of conduct in Standard Oil, in

22

General Electric, in AT&T, in Xerox, in IBM, and in

23

Microsoft, you see at least delayed innovation, and for

24

IBM and Microsoft, a powerful fast second strategy.

25

The basic idea is that the dominant firm holds

You can see them

How much time do I have?
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1
2
3
4

MR. HEYER:

You have got another ten minutes or

so.
DR. SCHERER:

Oh, okay.

Jackson's -- I think it's the penultimate paragraph --

5

MR. HEYER:

6

DR. SCHERER:

7
8
9

Then I will read Judge

Five or ten minutes.
-- in Judge Jackson's decision in

Microsoft.
"Most harmful of all is the message that
Microsoft's actions have conveyed to every enterprise

10

with the potential to innovate in the computer industry.

11

Through its conduct toward Netscape, IBM, Compaq, Intel

12

and others, Microsoft has demonstrated that it will use

13

its prodigious market power and immense profits to harm

14

any firm that insists on pursuing initiatives that could

15

intensify competition against one of Microsoft's core

16

products.

17

companies and stifling innovation deters investment in

18

technologies and businesses that exhibit the potential

19

to threaten Microsoft.

20

innovations that would truly benefit consumers never

21

occur for the sole reason that they do not coincide with

22

Microsoft's self-interest."

23

Microsoft's past success in hurting such

The ultimate result is that some

Well, Intel pursued similar policies.

Actually,

24

the truth is more nuanced than what Judge Jackson said.

25

What he said was basically right, but recognizing this,
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1

firms that had to compete with Microsoft or had to

2

compete with Intel pursued more sophisticated

3

strategies.

4

of dominant firm strategic interest, and therefore, we

5

may have missed significant innovations.

6

know what we have missed.

7

Sometimes they simply tried to avoid areas

We will never

But in other cases -- and I think this is the

8

larger majority of cases -- what they did was made their

9

appearance on the scene and then made it clear that they

10

really would like to be acquired by the dominant firm at

11

a very hefty price, and here we face a tough

12

counterfactual question.

13

be faster if they had seen their way clear to innovate

14

independently rather than having their operations taken

15

over by the dominant firm?

16

Would technological progress

Now, my own view is that open competition is

17

clearly superior in inducing vigorous innovation as

18

compared to situations in which one has a relatively

19

secure dominant firm.

20

should be to err on the side of maintaining competition

21

and especially, especially keeping both conduct

22

barriers, including fast second strategies, and

23

structural barriers at minimum feasible levels.

24

hard.

25

without a careful rule of reason analysis guided by

The presumption of antitrust

This is

There is no way to evaluate such situations
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1

appropriate economic theory.

2

positions exist, the job can be done, and it should be

3

done.

4
5

But when monopoly

At this, I will stop and will be happy to take
questions.

Thank you.

6

(Applause.)

7

MR. HEYER:

I think what we are going to do is

8

we are going to hold off on questions until we get into

9

the post-break round table discussion.

10

We will let each

of the panelists go.

11

Let me say a few words about Luke, eager to get

12

up here.

Luke has a very long title.

He teaches at

13

Vanderbilt.

14

recently at the Federal Trade Commission, and I am happy

15

to say I know Luke back from when he was a staff

16

economist at the Antitrust Division.

17

there, he became chief economist at the Federal Trade

18

Commission.

He is particularly proud of his work

Despite his work

19

With no further adieu, we can --

20

DR. FROEB:

Can we bring up the slides?

21

MR. HEYER:

Actually, these aren't Luke's.

DR. FROEB:

Thank you.

22

All

right.

23

It's a pleasure to be

24

here.

Every time I go in and out of academia, I get

25

more discouraged about what we are doing in academia.
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1

We work hard on problems no one cares about and publish

2

results in journals that nobody reads, and so it is a

3

delight to be back here working and thinking about

4

important problems that people care about.

5

This area is the source of the biggest policy

6

disagreement between the U.S. and the rest of the world.

7

The U.S. is relatively permissive towards single-firm

8

conduct, while the rest of the world is not.

9

reached agreement, by and large, on how to analyze

We have

10

price-fixing and merger cases.

11

differences about individual cases and evidence, we do

12

agree on the analytical framework.

13

And while we do have

There is no such agreement on single-firm

14

conduct, and why do we have this disagreement?

15

we really know about single-firm conduct?

16

importantly, do we know what we don't know about

17

single-firm conduct, and the message of this talk, there

18

is a lot of stuff we do not know, and I think we have

19

got to be really careful about policy in this area.

20

What do

But more

Before I start, I want to thank those who have

21

contributed to my thinking in this area.

22

would stop taking credit for other people's work once I

23

left the FTC, but apparently not for a couple more

24

years.

25

I thought I

Okay, so why is horizontal merger analysis
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1

easier than vertical?

The biggest reason is we ignore

2

the long-run indirect and strategic effects of

3

horizontal mergers.

4

increases in market power, and we have relatively good

5

understanding of how that occurs.

6

focus on the magnitude of the effect and how to estimate

7

it.

8

not on the analysis.

We focus solely on the short-run

Most disagreements

In other words, we disagree about the evidence, but

9

The second reason is that we have these distinct

10

mechanisms through which mergers affect consumer

11

welfare:

12

repositioning, efficiencies, and coordinated effects.

13

I think we know less about coordinated effects than we

14

want to, but the other mechanisms are well understood.

15

To analyze cases, we gather evidence on each mechanism,

16

and estimate the net effect by estimating the magnitude

17

and likelihood of each individual mechanism.

18

unilateral effects, entry, product

So, why is analyzing single-firm conduct harder?

19

Well, we are concerned about long-run, indirect

20

strategic effects.

21

did, we would have a very simple analysis.

22

second reason is that mechanisms with opposing effects

23

usually appear in a single kind of behavior.

24

is the simplest example.

25

price, but in the long run, we get fewer competitors.

We just cannot ignore them.

If we

And the

Predation

In the short run, firms reduce
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Vertical integration has the same problem.

In

2

the short run, we have the unilateral effect of vertical

3

integration where firms eliminate the double

4

marginalization.

5

raising-rivals'-costs or reducing-rivals'-revenue

6

mechanism.

7

But in the long run, we might have a

Exclusive dealing, again, has two opposing

8

mechanisms.

The immediate effect of exclusive dealing

9

is to reduce consumer choice, but indirectly, exclusive

10

dealing serves to align the incentives of the retailer

11

with the goals of the manufacturer.

12

effects is really, really difficult.

13

together, and we do not really have good ways of

14

balancing them.

15

So, balancing these
They appear

So, for these three reasons, single-firm conduct

16

is hard to analyze.

17

from Tim Brennan that says, let's consider the simplest

18

case where we have some kind of behavior that has only

19

two effects, two mechanisms at work.

20

proximate, immediate, direct, short-run mechanism that

21

we may know something about, but the effects of the

22

distant mechanism are much less certain.

23

There is a taxonomy that I borrowed

There is a

There are four possible outcomes, the distant

24

mechanisms and the proximate mechanisms can both be good

25

or bad.

Those are the relatively easy cases.

Where we
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1

run into problems is when the mechanisms work in

2

opposing ways, where the distant mechanism can be bad or

3

good and the proximate mechanism has the opposite sign.

4

When you are doing single-firm analysis,

5

evidence determines which box you go in, and most of the

6

kind of behavior we are concerned about goes in either

7

the off-diagonal boxes.

8

bad-good box, those are the ones where we run into

9

problems.

The good-bad box and the

Most of the problem cases fall into the lower

10

left box where we have a distant bad and a proximate

11

good, and you can think about bundling, as an example.

12

Bundling offers consumers a better price for the

13

bundle.

That is why they buy the bundle, and they are

14

better.

But in the long run, the bundle may exclude

15

competitors, and that may have a negative long-run

16

effect.

17

integration, but loyalty discounts and predation give

18

rise to the same kinds of problems.

19

I have already talked about vertical

So, how do we characterize the different

20

regimes?

21

rest of the world is that we disagree on the distant

22

effects of mechanisms, i.e., what is the magnitude of

23

these distant effects and how frequently do they occur?

24
25

The big difference between the U.S. and the

The Europeans are much more concerned with the
long-run negative effects of things like bundling and
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predation and loyalty discounts, and so they are

2

concerned with avoiding type II errors.

3

agencies are uncertain about the effects of single-firm

4

behavior, they are going to make mistakes.

5

either deter behavior which is good, type I error, or

6

let bad behavior go through, type II error.

7

is an inevitable trade-off:

8

type I error is to increase type II error and vice

9

versa.

10

If regulatory

They will

And there

The only way you can reduce

The U.S. regime is more concerned with type I

11

errors.

12

behavior.

13

Europeans are more concerned with type II errors, so

14

they regulate more aggressively.

15

who has the better regime, but we can say that relative

16

to the U.S., the Europeans commit more type I errors;

17

and relative to the Europeans, we commit more type II

18

errors.

19

We are more concerned with deterring good
So, we tend to regulate less aggressively.

We cannot determine

The "makes no business sense" standard is really

20

about trying to find cases in that box so we do not

21

deter any good behavior.

22

the Europeans; but they deter more good behavior than

23

we.

24
25

We miss more bad behavior than

So, the interesting question and the focus of
this hearing is, how do we determine the effects?
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1

correctly states that the effect question is a difficult

2

counterfactual.

3

had a firm behaved differently?

4

How do we know what would have happened

This requires comparing two states of the world,

5

only one of which we observe.

6

about the counterfactual.

7

would have happened had the firm behaved differently.

8

That is what Mike means

We have to figure out what

There are two ways to do it.

You can construct

9

a theory that describes competition, and use that theory

10

to tell me what would have happened had the firm behaved

11

differently.

12

The other way is to use what we call natural

13

experiments, and this is really a misnomer.

14

statistician in the audience will cringe when I use the

15

word "experiment," because there is nothing experimental

16

about economics data.

17

with the economy, probably for good reason.

18

Any

We do not get to run experiments

When I talk about natural experiments, I am

19

talking about comparing a market with the behavior to a

20

market without the behavior, and drawing inference about

21

the effect of the behavior by comparing those two

22

markets.

23

experiment mimic the effect of interest; and did we hold

24

everything else constant that could have accounted for

25

change.

The big questions here are how well does the

These are tough questions to answer.

For The Record, Inc.
(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555

25

1

We would particularly want to draw inference

2

about the distant, long-run, or strategic effects,

3

because we know less about them, and because uncertainty

4

about their effects is the source of conflict between

5

policy-makers, attorneys, and economists.

6

so hackneyed, but we need more information; we need more

7

research.

8

estimate the effects of these distant effects?

9

I hate to be

However, do we have natural experiments that

Here is my favorite study.

It is from a paper

10

by Mike Vita of the FTC, and it estimates what happened

11

when the appeals court overturned the must-carry

12

regulations for cable TV.

13

must carry local over-the-air broadcast channels, and in

14

close areas like Baltimore/Washington, they must carry

15

both the Baltimore and the D.C. stations.

16

Court overturned those regulations, which stations did

17

the cable TV monopolist drop?

18

Local cable TV monopolists

When the

Would the Baltimore cable system drop the

19

Baltimore over-the-air broadcast stations which compete

20

for audience share and advertising revenue, or would

21

they drop the Washington over-the-air stations where

22

they do not compete and can get the same content?

23

Mike found that they dropped the channels that had the

24

lower rating, and these tended to be the competitors.

25

Competitors were less likely to be dropped, and Mike
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1

interprets this as evidence refuting the anticompetitive

2

hypothesis.

3

not exclude its competitors, as long as they are

4

carrying a good product.

5

kind of use of the decision to try to draw inference

6

about these long-run distant effects.

7

He found that in the long run a firm will

I thought it was a very clever

Another Whinston natural experiment is Indiana's

8

ban on exclusive territories for beer distributors.

9

After a state law banned exclusive territories, beer

10

consumption fell by 6 percent.

11

concludes exclusive territories were pro-competitive.

12

Here again, the author

Other experiments show that gasoline prices are

13

3 cents higher in states where refiners are prohibited

14

from owning their own gas stations.

15

prices at company-owned stores are 3 percent lower.

16

Another experiment which is pretty messy, and I have

17

given this talk over in the UK, and they fight me on

18

this one, on the banning of tied pubs -- so if you are a

19

beer manufacturer, you can't own your own pub to

20

exclusively promote your own -- you have to carry at

21

least two brands of beer.

22

liked having their own pubs because they were using them

23

to promote their beer, and they thought it was an

24

effective way of competing against large brewers.

25

once they got rid of tied pubs, price went up and

For fast food,

Small beer manufacturers
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quantity went down.

2

changes that were going on at the same time, so it is a

3

hard experiment to interpret.

4

the small beer manufacturers fought the change.

5

liked being able to own their own tied pubs and to have

6

exclusives with a pub so they could promote their

7

brands, and sure enough, the small -- the small beer

8

manufacturers were hurt by the change.

9

However, there were a lot of other

But more telling was that
They

At the same time that we were reviewing the

10

literature, Francine Lafontaine, who knows more about

11

franchise agreements than I, and Margaret Slade, who

12

used to be at the FTC and is now in the UK, were

13

reviewing the literature as well, and they used a

14

different taxonomy than we did.

15

determine what can we learn about these distant effects,

16

but they were looking at government-imposed changes

17

versus voluntary changes, and they looked at a lot of

18

the same studies that we did.

19

We were trying to

Here is their conclusion:

When manufacturers impose restraints, not only

20

do they make themselves better off, but they also

21

typically allow consumers to benefit from higher quality

22

products and better service provisions.

23

when the Government prevents these kinds of contracts,

24

the effort is typically to reduce consumer welfare as

25

prices increase and service levels fall.

In contrast,

And they
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conclude that the interests of manufacturers and

2

consumer welfare are apt to be aligned, while

3

interference in the market is accomplished at the

4

expense of consumers, and, of course, manufacturers.

5

I would interpret this as evidence that these

6

kinds of arrangements are doing what we want them to do,

7

which is the U.S.'s relatively lenient attitude toward

8

single-firm behavior relative to the rest of the world.

9

I do realize there is a lot that we do not know, and I

10

think it is important to recognize that there is much we

11

do not know.

12

More importantly, how do we generalize these

13

studies to cases?

14

in a litigation context we are going to have a nice

15

natural experiment that we can interpret cleanly to tell

16

us what to do in a specific case.

17

sure how frequently we have been looking for experiments

18

like these.

19

I am not naive enough to think that

However, I am not

I am much less sanguine than Professor Scherer

20

that we know that much about innovation.

So, you look

21

at the Intel innovation, who knows what the innovation

22

rates would have been had we had more people in there?

23

Maybe there was room for only one firm in the market?

24

It is a really tough counterfactual.

25

more.

I wish we knew
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And finally, how do we test for the effects of

2

antitrust intervention?

Bill Kovacic has been a real

3

advocate for what he calls competition R&D.

4

around the world and talk to new antitrust regimes, we

5

say, look, don't just adopt a regime and freeze it,

6

because what if you get it wrong?

7

some kind of feedback mechanism, and start with the kind

8

of follow-up studies that are done at the FTC and DOJ.

9

I think they are absolutely crucial to try to

When we go

Instead, build in

10

characterize what are we doing, and to try to figure out

11

what would have happened had we done something

12

differently, in hope of improving.

13

So, characterizing what we do and determining

14

what its effects are really tough, but there are some

15

instances where we can figure out what is going on, and

16

I think we have to be on the lookout for good natural

17

experiments.

18

I guess that is all I want to say.

19

MR. HEYER:

20

(Applause.)

21

MR. HEYER:

Thank you.

Okay, our final panelist presenter

22

pre-break is Professor Wally Mullin.

You have got his

23

bio.

24

and particularly of interest to us I think here is that

25

he has done a fair amount of empirical work on some of

He is a professor at George Washington University,
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1

the issues we are trying to grapple with.

2

have a lot to say about theory, but he has gotten his

3

hands dirty a bit, and we look forward to his remarks.

4

DR. MULLIN:

Thanks.

A lot of us

I am delighted to have

5

this opportunity to appear in these public hearings, and

6

I thank the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade

7

Commission for jointly sponsoring these hearings and, of

8

course, in particular, the co-moderators today, Ken

9

Heyer and Bill Kovacic.

10

So, switching gears, today I want to talk about

11

what lessons we can draw from the history of antitrust

12

enforcement, okay?

13

that are kind of in the DNA of current antitrust

14

enforcers, but in the interest of redundancy, I am going

15

to include some of those lessons as well.

Now, these may very well be lessons

16

So, the initial set of dominant firms arose out

17

of the trust movement in the sort of merger to monopoly

18

way.

19

contemporary interest, you know, I certainly acknowledge

20

that similar economic and legal conditions may never

21

return; however, the historical emphasis can still

22

provide a modern researcher with a relatively large

23

sample of dominant firms which faced antitrust scrutiny.

24

So, as an empirical economist, that is very attractive.

25

So, in saying that this should be an area of

So, I am going to focus in the discussion today,
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in part, as reflected in my own work, on an admittedly

2

non-random sample of these firms, okay, Standard Oil,

3

U.S. Steel, which Mike has already talked about a little

4

bit, and American Sugar Refining Corporation.

5

choice arises out of a variety of factors.

6

of the economic importance of the firms, you know, at

7

that particular time, the legal significance of the

8

associated antitrust decisions, and to some extent the

9

similarity and differences in their business strategies.

10

So, this

One is sort

In work with co-authors, I have studied two of

11

these firms.

12

Oil, but other people here have, and obviously it's a

13

well-known case in terms of monopolization law.

14

I haven't published any work on Standard

So, since all three firms faced antitrust

15

prosecution, we can examine not only dominant firm

16

behavior, but also the effects of prosecution, and we

17

can also study the effects of remedy as implemented or,

18

admittedly, more speculatively, consider the effects of

19

remedies that were not ordered, because in some cases no

20

liability was found.

21

So, let's start with Standard Oil.

My remarks

22

on this will be relatively brief, reflecting sort of

23

comparative advantage issues.

24

if we want to have a poster child for different types of

25

dominant firms, Standard Oil was an aggressive

So, Standard Oil, right,
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competitor, okay?

2

engaged in predatory pricing has been debunked by McGee,

3

the company had other practices that still marked it as

4

an aggressive competitor.

5

Klein in 1996 published an article studying how Standard

6

Oil obtained differential rebates from the railroads on

7

petroleum transportation, and that is a source,

8

according to Granitz and Klein, of their sort of

9

supra-competitive rents, and those rebates, of course,

10
11

So, while the claim that Standard Oil

For example, Granitz and

advantaged it relative to other refiners.
Of course, Standard Oil was found guilty and

12

dissolution was ordered, and it was kind of alluded to

13

by Mike, Bill Comanor and he have argued in a paper that

14

dissolution of Standard Oil raised long-term industry

15

performance, and also in that paper, this is

16

counterfactual, it would have been good had U.S. Steel

17

been dissolved.

18

In his academic work, Bill Kovacic has argued

19

that the effect of this dissolution rests in part on the

20

fact that the dissolution involved formerly independent

21

entities.

22

dissolution child's story in which everyone lives

23

happily ever after as an automatic indication that

24

structural remedies in all forms and in all

25

circumstances will work.

So, one shouldn't necessarily take this as a

You have to be sensitive to
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the particular facts involved, but given the fact that

2

Standard Oil was organized as such that what was spun

3

off were things that were in some sense formerly

4

independent or had a certain amount of autonomy within

5

Standard Oil in terms of decision-making, in terms of

6

things like corporate culture, the enterprise was able

7

to grow and prosper going forward, and so my take-away

8

would be that, you know, a different remedy in another

9

industry or even with a firm with a different internal

10

organization and history might have unduly sacrificed

11

production costs, but that is merely a speculative

12

comment with a note of caution.

13

So, in terms of U.S. Steel, Mike has already

14

touched upon part of this.

15

Rockefeller and Standard Oil is the poster child for the

16

aggressive competitor.

17

poster child for a dominant firm that may be good for

18

competitors and bad for competition, which was something

19

that the Supreme Court didn't realize at the time.

20

So, you know, John D.

United States Steel is sort of a

So, in published work with co-author brothers,

21

and it's otherwise hard to find two other Mullins, we

22

have presented evidence that dissolution, which, of

23

course, was never ordered, would have lowered steel

24

prices in that case, in particular, and raised steel

25

output.

So, in particular, the pattern of
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contemporaneous stock market reactions to events from

2

the dissolution suit, okay, basically from 1911 to 1920,

3

not only judicial decisions but periods when it was

4

rumored U.S. Steel might dissolve itself to basically

5

avoid prosecution, and then a denial of that rumor the

6

next week, some subset of the events that I mentioned

7

ended up having big stock market reactions for U.S.

8

Steel, indicating that there was news sent to the

9

securities markets in those particular events, and in

10

those weeks, the stocks of customers, in particular, of

11

U.S. Steel, particularly the railroads, reacted in a way

12

that suggested that the stock market believed that

13

dissolution would have lowered steel prices.

14

So, interestingly -- and this is a bit in

15

contrast to maybe what Mike Scherer was talking about --

16

one of the things I also find of interest, and this is

17

part of the tension of monopolization law, is that there

18

are parts, going back to things that might have

19

potentially been sources of market power, that

20

contemporary scholarship would suggest maybe were, in

21

fact, efficiency-enhancing.

22

Steel was losing market share over time, and you might

23

think, well, wait a minute, is there some sort of scarce

24

factor upstream from steel production that they could

25

use and acquire in order to foreclose entry, you know,

So, in particular, U.S.
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or at least put a limit on that, right?

2

So, historically they were vertically integrated

3

into iron ore properties, as the Carnegie properties had

4

been, and during the period where they were undergoing

5

antitrust scrutiny at the start of the 20th Century,

6

they added to that a significant amount by long-term

7

leasing the iron ore properties of the Great Northern

8

Railway and James J. Hill.

9

referred to as the Hill properties.

So, that is why they are
And that was viewed

10

as anticompetitive by contemporary antitrust authorities

11

for some reason, as I will sort of talk about in the

12

next slide, but that is not only criticized by the

13

standing Congressional Committees -- the Federal Trade

14

Commission wasn't around at the time -- but the Bureau

15

of Corporation's report criticized it, and, in fact,

16

U.S. Steel ends up cancelling the lease in 1911 in part

17

to try to forestall prosecution because this was that

18

big of deal to the Department of Justice at the time.

19

Okay, so what might be some of the lessons we

20

take from there?

So, as before, of course, the law

21

should protect competition, not competitors.

22

it strikes me -- as I said, I recognize that this would

23

be known by the contemporary court, but it is a good

24

case to assign students, because you have them read the

25

case, and, of course, the Supreme Court is praising U.S.

You know,
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Steel because its competitors had such nice things to

2

say about it at trial, and the contrast with Standard

3

Oil is pretty stark.

4

effect is not only due to single-firm conduct in a

5

narrow sense, but U.S. Steel's actions in organizing the

6

Gary dinners, which it later abandoned, clearly had a

7

collusive intent, and they were also bad for

8

competition, although good for competitors.

9

U.S. Steel's anticompetitive

So, another tension of monopolization law is

10

that even a firm with market power may have

11

efficiency-enhancing innovations, right?

12

case would be in which, you know, if you wanted to do

13

some variation of the diagram, the easy case would be,

14

oh, there are firms that have market power and there are

15

firms that have cost reductions, and they are completely

16

disjoint.

17

fact, in terms of work that we have done, U.S. Steel was

18

a firm with both elements.

19

So, the easy

I say empirically, that is not the case.

In

So, in a paper with one of my brother

20

co-authors, okay, we didn't have a falling out over the

21

difference in these papers, orthogonal to that issue,

22

the paper with Joe Mullin examines the Hill ore lease,

23

and says that, on balance, that it seems to be best

24

explained as being efficiency-enhancing rather than as

25

vertical foreclosure.
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There are several reasons for this.

So, if you

2

sort of back up, the underlying problem of developing an

3

iron ore mine is a problem of relationship-specific

4

investment, something that was studied later by

5

transaction cost economics, both for kind of developing

6

the mine or the investment in the mine, which, of

7

course, is not mobile once it is sunk, and also

8

development of transportation to get the ore or some

9

variation of the ore to market, and that transportation,

10

given where those mines were, was over the Great

11

Northern Railway, which otherwise would have owned the

12

mining rights.

13

So, the specific contractual terms that were in

14

the lease, which caused the Bureau of Corporations to

15

scratch its head circa 1906, has been studied by people

16

like Crocker and Masten.

17

they had a take-or-pay provision which was quite large,

18

so U.S. Steel was basically committed to making these

19

large payments, and, in fact, during the initial period

20

of the execution of the lease before it fell under

21

antitrust scrutiny, they were, in fact, investing --

22

they were basically scaling up to exploit that property

23

at a very high level.

24
25

So, one example of this is

And it's striking, also, in the sense that you
might imagine some notion of vertical foreclosure or
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barrier to entry would be, oh, well, they are going to

2

acquire this iron ore.

3

don't need to exploit it to produce right now.

4

just going to sit on it and prevent anyone else from

5

gaining entry to it, but, in fact, they invested heavily

6

in trying to exploit the iron ore.

7

They have other iron ores.

They

They are

It is possible, of course, it had an

8

anticompetitive effect, so it is not so much a -- you

9

know, a complete nesting of the hypotheses, but rather,

10

sort of saying, our judgment, my judgment, the bulk of

11

the evidence would be that that particular aspect of

12

their innovation was something that was

13

efficiency-enhancing.

14

And, of course, the challenge for contemporary

15

antitrust enforcers is what sort of humility should they

16

exercise when faced with some sort of business practice

17

that they don't automatically have an obvious efficiency

18

explanation for?

19

people are going to be aware of transaction cost work,

20

et cetera, right, but presumably, we will figure out 20

21

years from now other reasons why some firms might have

22

some sort of purpose.

23

that the behavior is necessarily benign, but that's the

24

situation that requires the people to look at it.

25

Now, obviously the staff and other

That doesn't necessarily mean

So, finally, love of my life, American Sugar
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1

Refining.

2

series of paper on this.

3

that you don't necessarily know what you're getting into

4

when you start.

5

in the Rand Journal, they profitably engaged in

6

predatory pricing, and that was one of their business

7

practices.

8
9

So, David Genesove and I have written a
This is one of those things

So, in a paper that recently appeared

Now, these joint hearings have already included
a rich discussion of predatory pricing in an earlier

10

session, so I won't recapitulate that now.

11

into some element of that in the discussion.

12

I noted in the paper that compelling evidence of

13

predation is rare.

14

academic consensus, but obviously also in the case law,

15

but we think the evidence that we present in the paper

16

in this case is compelling.

17

We might get
David and

That is reflected not only in the

So, in terms of a couple of things to point out,

18

American Sugar engaged in predation.

They didn't prey

19

on all entrants.

20

trigger predation or didn't trigger immediate predation;

21

however, the nature of the market was such that after

22

they preyed, they acquired the entrants and other fringe

23

firms at lower buy-out prices.

24

were making the dynamic calculation, they were sort of

25

saying, well, here's some small firm, it's entering, you

Every single entry episode didn't

So, in a sense, if they
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1

know, no big deal.

2

of like, okay, well, now it's time to prey and buy

3

people out and raise up our market share.

4

As more firms enter, they are sort

In terms of trying to rationalize the

5

observations under different theories of business

6

behavior, that manipulation of rivals' beliefs played a

7

very big role as in some of the reputation models.

8

once again, it is not as if they sent out a clarion call

9

saying that, oh, they were going to prey and then they

10

were going to buy people out, so, in fact -- precisely

11

because there were multiple firms they were basically

12

preying on simultaneously, there are cases in which they

13

basically made an arrangement with one of the firms to

14

say, okay, well, fine, we are going to buy you out, here

15

are these terms, but let's keep this secret, and so --

16

and then continue the war, and then buy out the other

17

firms.

18

So,

So, in some sense, part of the aspect of kind of

19

buying out firms and engaging in predation is that the

20

process is sort of the reverse of what we are calling

21

the free-rider problem when you form a trust, right?

22

you form a trust, you are going to restrict output, and

23

so people will want to stay outside of it and just take

24

advantage of the output lowering entity.

25

Conversely, if there's predation going on, and

If
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1

you know there will be a buy-out and the predatory

2

pricing is going to end, of course, people also want to

3

free-ride on that.

4

beliefs is I think part and parcel of being able to be

5

successful.

So, the manipulation of rivals'

6

So, there was a monopolization suit, and it

7

stretched on over a period of time, that eventually

8

resulted in a consent decree.

9

sort of, you know, maybe, you know, happy lessons here

But there are some other

10

that antitrust serves as a deterrent on a variety of

11

levels.

12

to be punitive, but obviously you also want to think,

13

well, gee, you hope other firms get the message and we

14

don't have to go prosecute them, or this firm in the

15

future, once bitten, twice shy, and so will behave

16

better, and have some sort of implicit consent decree.

17

Part of the rationale of the antitrust law is

So, there are two examples of this, and one

18

deals with American Sugar and one deals with other

19

firms.

20

Sugar underwent sort of partial "voluntary" dissolution,

21

so this was before the consent decree, because of the

22

government victories in the American Tobacco and

23

Standard Oil cases.

24
25

So, during its monopolization case, American

So, focusing on American Tobacco or Standard Oil
as cases, those basically had a spillover effect on the
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1

behavior of another firm, in this case American Sugar,

2

and presumably other firms.

3

non-random sample is, of course, it may be that the

4

whole universe of firms behaved differently, which is a

5

reason why people should do more work on it.

6

The difficulty of the

Later on, there is also an impact on American

7

Sugar itself.

David Genesove and I also studied not a

8

single-firm conduct, but in terms of collusive conduct,

9

we studied The Sugar Institute of the twenties and

10

thirties, of which American Sugar was the largest and

11

most important member, but no longer as large as in 1911

12

or 1914.

13

So, this is noted in our AER paper, even though

14

it wasn't the focus of that paper, which was that the

15

legal representatives of American Sugar at these

16

basically collusive meetings within the industry were

17

very sensitive to things like discussion of price.

18

was a part of the battle, in a sense, within The Sugar

19

Institute, one person complaining to his boss, oh, gee,

20

we are never allowed to do anything that's going to have

21

any real effect, and so that may just be the wise

22

counsel of American Sugar at the time, but one has to

23

think that the fact that they had had this antitrust

24

prosecution was something that empowered people within

25

the firm to say, okay, compliance is important.

That
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1

certainly something you think that going forward would

2

be an important part of antitrust enforcement.

3

So, all I have for now.

4

(Applause.)

5

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

6

I would now like to invite Jon Baker to present

Thanks, Wally.

7

his comments.

Jon, as you know, like Mike and Luke, is

8

part of the galaxy of superb economists who have headed

9

the Bureau of Economics at the FTC.

In addition to

10

Jon's affiliation with the Commission, in many ways he's

11

been what I consider to be hitting for the scholarly

12

cycle.

13

work, both at the Commission in matters such as Staples,

14

but also, in his own published work, he has contributed

15

wonderfully to theory.

16

that took place over the Verizon-Twombly matter, I many

17

times went back and referred to Jon's paper on two

18

Sherman Act dilemmas from the early 1990s.

19

apropos for this panel as well, Jon, like so many of our

20

presenters, has a good aptitude for history, reflected

21

not only in his survey paper in the JEP on competition

22

enforcement, but also in his recent paper in the

23

Antitrust Law Journal on the development of widely

24

accepted norms and standards, and his political

25

bargaining paper.

Not only has he done excellent quantitative

In studying the deliberations

And quite

We are delighted to have Jon here
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1

today.

2

DR. BAKER:

Thank you.

Thank you, Bill.

That

3

was a very nice introduction.

4

expect from a case book co-author, but I appreciate it

5

anyway.

6
7

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

MR. HEYER:

9

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

11

I should have added, he

is the co-author of the most astonishing and --

8

10

It is not what I would

Copies on sale in the lobby.
During the break, there

will be the signing process -DR. BAKER:

And I am always delighted to be back

12

to see all my former FTC and Justice Department

13

colleagues.

14

days at the Antitrust Division.

15

I worked with Ken and Luke back in the old

Well, so let me -- I have a -- sort of several

16

comments on what we have heard this morning.

17

little bit disjointed, and I will just get into them and

18

see how far we get.

19

They are a

The first is on the question of what can we

20

learn from the old monopolization cases.

On the one

21

hand, there are very few of them.

22

profile, but there aren't many, and a lot of them were

23

reviewed when antitrust standards were very different

24

than they are today and when ideas about remedies were

25

different than they are today.

They are often high

I don't think we would
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1

remedy the Standard Oil monopoly were that to have

2

appeared today anything like the way it was remedied

3

then.

4

broken up to engage in head-to-head competition from the

5

beginning.

6

We would have tried to get the parts that were

So, there's something funny about this exercise.

7

The -- you wouldn't -- it's a little like saying, well,

8

what can we learn about merger analysis from studying

9

Pabst and Von's, you know, some poster children of

10

merger cases that are no longer thought to be good

11

precedents, although they are technically controlling

12

Supreme Court precedents, as an aside.

13

Well, what we learn from Mike Scherer and Wally

14

Mullin, I think, is something that perhaps we have

15

always known, which is the value of careful

16

case-specific analysis.

17

system at its best makes possible.

18

This is what the judicial

Now, that's not to say that the courts have

19

always undertaken this -- the adversarial system has

20

always forced the same level of analysis that later

21

scholars have been able to bring to these cases.

22

mean, it took 50 years, but the Mullin Brothers finally

23

got to the bottom of the U.S. Steel case.

24

like that to have happened, in the case itself.

25

the other hand, it shows you the power of case-specific

I

One would
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1

analysis to hear Mike and Wally go through what they

2

have learned about these cases.

3

That's not to say that their conclusions are

4

undisputable, but the kind of analysis they do, they can

5

focus in on the issues, and it really does support the

6

kind of work that we do in the enforcement agencies and

7

the courts.

8
9

Now, let me move on to say something about the
issues Luke raised.

It struck me, one interesting point

10

is the short-term focus, Luke says, of our antitrust

11

thinking.

12

guess I'm a little -- I read it in the light of also

13

thinking about a paper that John Lopatka and Bill Page

14

wrote where they argued that antitrust enforcement

15

courts are more congenial to -- or the decisions, I

16

suppose you would say, the decisions are more driven by

17

the short-term benefits and costs than the long-term

18

ones.

He didn't quite put it this way, but I mean I

19

If you take that perspective and think about

20

Luke's charts, it seems to me that one message is we

21

shouldn't just give a free pass to all those kind of

22

practices in the lower left box of Luke's taxonomy:

23

Price predation, bundling, vertical integration and

24

loyalty discounts.

25

says the proximate effect is good and the distant effect

These are things where I think Luke
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1
2

is bad.
Now, I suppose that my characterization of the

3

implication of those boxes is a little different from

4

Luke's, but in order to go beyond the picture Luke drew

5

to an enforcement regime that gives a free pass -- well,

6

free pass is a little strong -- but that makes it tough

7

to bring cases in the lower left-hand box, you have to

8

take another step in the logic.

9

some people do, things like the Government can't do a

You have to argue, as

10

good job analyzing these practices, separating out the

11

two kinds of effects, and remedying it, and you have to

12

conclude that the costs of one type of error are greater

13

than the other.

14

that we have to apply before we can reach the conclusion

15

that antitrust should be hands off on all these

16

practices.

17

There's a whole additional apparatus

In thinking about Luke's taxonomy a little more,

18

I started thinking about most favored customer clause

19

cases or most favored nation clause cases.

20

Department for a while had an enforcement program

21

involving dominant firms that instituted these kinds of

22

practices.

23

most favored customer clause in its contracts with

24

healthcare providers, and I'm thinking of -- was it

25

Delta Dental, there's a bunch of Delta Dental cases, and

The Justice

It was a dominant health insurer that had a
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1

I think there's some other ones.

2

So, the idea was the provider, the doctor or the

3

dentist or whatever it was, wouldn't lower rates to

4

rival health insurers without also lowering it to the

5

dominant provider, let's call it Blue Cross, and so that

6

makes it impractical for the rivals or the entrants to

7

make procompetitive deals; that is, rivals to Blue

8

Cross.

9

lower rates, I'll funnel more business to you, the

10

provider, and we will both do better, and then this

11

creates competition for Blue Cross.

12

Insurers want to come in and say if you give me

Of course, these most favored customer clause

13

provisions can also result in collusion by making

14

discounting more costly, but we are in the dominant firm

15

context here, so we will put that aside.

16

The interesting thing about these most favored

17

customer clauses as a practice is that there are

18

efficiency justifications that are often offered, but in

19

a health care setting, they are not very plausible.

20

best efficiency justifications are either preventing

21

opportunism when futures markets are unavailable, which

22

sometimes happens in long-term contracting where you see

23

these kinds of provisions, or perhaps signaling low

24

prices where buyer search is costly, and these are the

25

kind of -- here, we're thinking there about retail
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1
2

businesses selling to customers.
Perhaps Luke will say to me I just moved these

3

provisions in the health care context from his lower

4

left box to his upper left box, where the efficiency

5

justification isn't very good, and so there isn't a

6

problem, but I think if you accept what I have gotten to

7

so far, that these provisions can be troublesome for

8

dominant firms to contract using them in many of these

9

health care contexts, you have to ask, well, when we

10

move outside the health care context, perhaps to one

11

where the efficiency justification is potentially more

12

plausible, don't we have to analyze?

13

think about whether the bad guy story and the good guy

14

story -- which is more powerful as between the two?

15

my take from Luke's taxonomy is we ought to think hard

16

about practices in the lower left-hand box and analyze

17

them as best we can.

18

Don't we have to

So,

On natural experiments, Luke, I think you missed

19

an opportunity when you were talking about experiments.

20

I have a new motto for the FTC, and this really would be

21

your motto, not mine, "We fool around with the economy

22

every day."

23

principle -- that was just a joke -- natural experiments

24

are fine in principle, and I basically am sympathetic to

25

what Luke was trying to do with them.

Natural experiments are fine in
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1

Tim Bresnahan and I have a recent paper where we

2

talk about something similar.

We say that a key

3

challenge for antitrust analysis and empirical

4

industrial organization economics going forward, which

5

is not recognized in antitrust to the same extent that

6

it's recognized in economics, is to exploit similarities

7

among related industries that focus an inquiry involving

8

the industry and the firms under study.

9

examples different from Luke's, but I think the spirit

We have some

10

of the exercise is similar.

11

assuming it's a good natural experiment, is what

12

generalization you can make from it.

13

An important question, even

Tim and I think that the right generalization is

14

the level of the industry.

15

at some of the examples that Luke has about -- oh, I

16

don't know, gasoline divorcement or something like that,

17

but not -- and perhaps that would create a presumption

18

about gasoline retailing, but I wouldn't connect the

19

dots and generalize to all vertical restraints.

20

Luke's examples, for example, in his representative

21

studies are about manufacturer- distributor

22

relationships in consumer products.

23

much about most favored customer clauses, for example,

24

in health insurer contracts with providers.

25

In other words, I would look

All of

They do not tell us

Finally -- I am not sure how much time I have
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1

left.

Do I have time left?

Okay.

2

MR. HEYER:

Is it good?

3

DR. BAKER:

It's not as good as what's happened

4

already, Ken.

5
6

No, I think I'll just stop right there, and I
will -- it's not that good, Ken.

7
8
9
10

I don't get better.

MR. HEYER:

Save it for the discussion, all

DR. BAKER:

We will save it for the discussion.

right.

Thank you.

11

(Applause.)

12

MR. HEYER:

The final person we are going to

13

hear from before the break is Cliff Winston, who you'll

14

see is a long-time economist at The Brookings

15

Institution and has done just an incredible amount of

16

empirical work, largely having to do with regulated

17

industries but not exclusively, and partly because he's

18

really taken on some tough challenges empirically, he

19

seems like a perfect person to invite to talk here, and

20

let's just hear from Cliff.

21

DR. WINSTON:

22
23

Thanks a lot for inviting me to

this conference.
Let me, since I'm a little bit on the fringe in

24

this enterprise, sort of tell you my context and how I

25

was thinking about this and eventually how I synthesized
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1

what we have heard.

2

When Jim Taronji called me about this, my sort

3

of immediate perception was you were planning a series

4

of conferences that were basically assessing the

5

antitrust activity at the federal level of DOJ and FTC,

6

and I naturally thought this, and it turns out that -- I

7

had just finished a book called Government Failure verse

8

Market Failure that looks at all areas where the

9

government intervenes in trying to correct market

10

failures, including but certainly not limited to market

11

power, but information problems, externalities, public

12

good, public production and the like, and figured, well,

13

this is right along the lines of what I have just

14

written up, and so I can sort of look at what you're

15

doing from this perspective.

16

But I also pointed out that I was going to be

17

away a couple of weeks before the conference and

18

literally just got back late the night before, so it

19

would be good if I got the presentations beforehand.

20

Otherwise, you know, I would have to be on the fly, but

21

I thought there obviously might be difficulties in

22

getting things to me, and I was checking my web when I

23

was in Europe, but late last night, I realized a couple

24

had come in, but unfortunately one was in WordPerfect,

25

and Brookings doesn't use WordPerfect.

I assume Mike
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1

does this as a protest against Microsoft.

2

WordPerfect better.

3

have a fall-back position.

4

I like

So, I didn't have them, but I did

What I was going to do was sort of outline a

5

template, in general, about how I would assess the

6

performance of a federal agency and what recommendations

7

that I might make in terms of improving performance, set

8

that up, say, okay, and I'll just plug in everything I

9

hear in these areas.

10

So, let me outline the template and then just

11

make a few comments on what we've heard.

12

thing in general that I would ask and think about for

13

any federal agency is, is there compelling evidence of a

14

problem to begin with?

15

some stylized facts, summary measures of welfare, you

16

know, that something is going on, you know, information

17

problems are costing consumers hundreds of millions of

18

dollars a year, monopoly is causing similar kinds of

19

costs?

20

So, the first

That is, you know, are there

Okay, the first thing, just get a big picture

21

overview, when I do these things with transportation, it

22

is very easy, because I can just point to graphs of the

23

lake, there is a problem, congestion going on, airline

24

delay, going up, there's a problem, not too much

25

controversy about that.
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1

The second question one would ask, you know,

2

what is the scholarly evidence -- when I mean the

3

scholarly evidence, I mean quantitative, welfare type

4

calculations, and certainly counterfactuals isolating

5

the effects of other factors, on first market failure,

6

what do we know about how markets are performing or not

7

performing, since they may be the source of the problem,

8

and government failure, that is, how are governments

9

doing in all of this, and third, government success.

10

So, you know, here are the things you want to look at

11

from the bottom up, the little pieces of evidence that

12

we look at to assess the agency.

13

Then the third thing, since this really is a

14

scholarly enterprise, when I ask the big picture

15

question, where is the field going?

16

we're getting a lot of the intellectual infrastructure

17

from the scholars who work in the area, how does the

18

field look at this problem?

19

they doing?

20

future, if at all?

21

could give to researchers to sort of get them focused on

22

problems that they are interested in, so on and so

23

forth?

24
25

You know, since

What kind of research are

Where are they likely to help in the
Are there incentives the agency

And then finally, you know, given one, two and
three, where do we go from here?

How do we put all this

For The Record, Inc.
(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555

55

1

together and say, okay, here is how I think you can

2

improve your performance and your interventions, or here

3

is what I think we, you know, we need to know before we

4

can give confident recommendations.

5

So, let me go through these now with an eye

6

toward what has been said and what has not been said

7

about them.

8

didn't really hear exactly what I was looking for there,

9

but there's a reason.

Okay, first, the big picture question, I

It's really hard.

They are

10

trying -- and I think it is one of the big problems --

11

maybe the biggest problem with industrial organization,

12

is unlike other fields in economics, there isn't this

13

stylized fact that you're constantly facing that reminds

14

you of what's going on out there.

15

It's not like in labor economics where you hear

16

about what the unemployment rate is, okay, or the

17

percent of people below the poverty line.

18

these numbers, you know, these are the kinds of things

19

that researchers get to work on in dealing with this.

20

It is not like trade where we hear what's going on with

21

the dollar, the trade balance.

22

out about we now have sort of have negative net capital

23

funds, I assure you now a lot of paper is going to come

24

out about this, trying to explain it to us, what is

25

going on, so on and so forth.

You hear

Recently, it just came

You can think of a whole
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1

bunch of things, but when you talk about IO, yes, your

2

instincts are well, we want some measure of economic

3

welfare, but that's not presented by the Commerce

4

Department.

5

It's hard to construct that kind of thing.

Now, that said, there was an effort to do that.

6

In the sixties, there was a lot of effort to think of

7

things in terms of concentration ratios, and that was

8

sort of our stylized fact, and there was even a

9

Commission, the Neal Commission, you know, that met and

10

made recommendations about, you know, deconcentration of

11

industries that exceeded a 70 percent level of

12

concentration, and that may not be something that people

13

take seriously today, but there was a time when that was

14

sort of an orientation towards thinking about IO and

15

even antitrust policy, okay?

16

But there really isn't that, which is a bit of a

17

concern, because you never sort of know, well, are you

18

working on a problem that's really important?

19

only one who talked about that was Luke in terms of

20

motivating -- while we care about this, and he said this

21

in terms of, you know, apparent disagreement or I would

22

say just different approaches toward antitrust policy

23

between the U.S. and the EU, and I just simply say,

24

well, does that signify different concerns with the same

25

problem?

And the
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To the extent the U.S. is less aggressive and

2

more permissible and allows certain things to go on,

3

does it basically feel that competition is pretty

4

intense, and maybe this is just signifying we really

5

don't have that much of a problem, whereas in Europe,

6

they might feel that there is more, but this is

7

certainly something to think about.

8
9

Okay, secondly, the scholarly evidence on the
various issues, you know, first, looking at market

10

failure -- and I agree completely with Mike, it's an

11

excellent point, a point that is not made enough, that

12

too much of economists' orientation on market failure is

13

static inefficiencies, so price distortions and the

14

like, where so much of the big gains from policy

15

improvements are the dynamic ones, because that's the

16

counterfactual that you don't see.

17

So, if you look at what we've learned about

18

deregulation in terms of what regulation we're doing,

19

the big ticket effects were suppressing innovation,

20

right?

21

order effects.

22

shifts of cost curves as you completely change what

23

you're doing, shifts of demand curves where you provide

24

new products, okay?

25

firm is working like a constrained regulatory policy,

So, there you get, you know, more than first
You get really big effects, you know,

So, to the extent that a dominant
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you know, the effects can be big.

2

Now, that said, you know, measuring these things

3

are very difficult, and, you know, it's not clear to me

4

that we really have hard evidence on this kind of thing.

5

I think the anecdotes are informative, but it would be

6

nice if there was a really strong body of literature on

7

the dynamic effects of delayed innovation, so on and so

8

forth.

9

I would also add, though, just for balance, more

10

emphasis on the self-correcting nature of markets.

All

11

the time you are listening to these firms, they are all

12

dinosaurs, right?

13

Mike mentioned U.S. Steel.

14

right?

And it was foreign competition, the mini-mills,

15

right?

I mean, look at the auto companies, you know,

16

look at Ford, GM, and it's amazing.

17

down the line.

18

you know, it's important to keep in mind the

19

self-correcting nature of markets in all of this.

20

Along with that, then, is the parallel of

Look what's happened to them all.
Look what happened to them,

You know, go on

Now, this does take time, but I think,

21

government failure.

Now, there are parallels of all the

22

policies we're talking about.

23

a vacuum.

24

intersects a lot of major policies.

25

for example, right?

Antitrust is not made in

Everything that you're talking about
Trade protection,

You know, more often than not we
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hear about, well, we need more competition in the

2

airline industry.

3

are not going to do that.

4

policy effectively working against what antitrust policy

5

is trying to do.

6

Yes, let's allow cabin -- oh, no, we
So, here you have trade

We talk about technology policy with no mention

7

of what happened in the early 1980s with the change in

8

the patent law, right?

9

lawsuits are going up now, you know, talk about, you

Patents are going up now,

10

know, impact on innovation and technical changes, look

11

what's done in technology policy.

12

policy, but it's the crazy patent system that we've got

13

now with, you know, the change in the '82 Act.

14

That's not antitrust

Regulatory policy, Luke's point was fair enough

15

about cable behavior, but again, it's a regulatory

16

policy that's facilitating that, you know, the whole

17

communications regulatory policy is screwed up.

18

this is not antitrust's, you know, cross to bear, but to

19

some extent, it is.

20

constantly at cross-purposes with other areas of what

21

the Government is trying to do, it is going to make it

22

very difficult for you to figure out to do, but I might

23

add, the first best thing to do would be to have a

24

technology policy, regulatory policy and trade policy

25

that makes some sense, okay?

Again,

So, where you have a policy that is
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Government successes, you know, I think the key

2

thing on the government successes is almost more of the

3

learning rather than the status assessments.

4

Standard Oil was interpreted as a success, and let me

5

just suggest that there is some controversy about that,

6

Bob Crandall and I head our exploration on antitrust

7

policy, and you know, our look at what the

8

counterfactual evidence was that, you know, there was

9

very little that we could see from changes in prices, if

You know,

10

one wanted to use that as a measure of welfare, and it

11

is certainly not a reasonable starting point for what

12

Standard Oil did.

13

I think the more attractive thing that I would

14

point to about antitrust is the learning just how one

15

thinks about problems in terms of anticompetitive --

16

what was initially thought of as sort of knee-jerk

17

anticompetitive reaction as to whether these things were

18

really efficiency-enhancing types of behavior and also

19

just the nature of dynamics, how things are changed, and

20

I think that's where antitrust policy has gone and is

21

certainly a lot better.

22

Now, the big thing about all of this and my

23

concern about this whole area is the effectiveness of

24

this evidence accumulated, because that's what you

25

really want.

In certain areas, just to go to a
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completely different area, you know, one's seen study

2

after study about congestion policy in this country,

3

every one of them, huge welfare losses, the Government

4

ought to have efficient pricing, and no one is really

5

disagreeing with that.

6

from here to there, but the evidence really builds

7

beautifully, and you can just sort of drop it on

8

somebody's lap and say, okay, look, deal with this, and

9

it's easy to do that.

10

There are obviously variations

Here, it is quite hard.

I mean, yes, there are

11

fragments of evidence, cases here and there, and as I

12

said, what Crandall and I attempted to do was actually

13

get a base case for a starting point of saying that

14

this -- and if you disagree with that, fair enough, but

15

at least build on that, reshape it, and then start

16

adding more, and frankly, the disappointment has been,

17

at least in the reaction to that paper, is, you know, I

18

could -- is predictable either pro or critical antitrust

19

people reacting to it, but in terms of actually new

20

evidence being added to the enterprise, that just

21

doesn't seem to be what idle people care about these

22

days, which leads to my third concern, where is the

23

empirical IO field going?

24

mention of that here, and with good reason.

25

And there was very little

I mean, it is not clear where it is going in
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relationship to your interest in what is going on here.

2

I mean, my sense, as I would say more of an observer

3

than a participant, that empirical IO is sort of trying

4

to get "uber" dynamic model of industry behavior, you

5

know, that's what we're looking for, for the -- what's

6

the word -- the Holy Grail, I guess that's because I saw

7

The Da Vinci Code on the plane.

8

trying to do, and to the extent there's empirical work,

9

it's pretty much demonstration papers, right?

10

That's what we are

I mean, a lot of them are really pretty trivial,

11

you know, you can get data on it -- and I won't go into

12

examples, but you know what I'm talking about, and you

13

know, who cares?

14

to show, yeah, I can get something estimated with some

15

generalized method of moments estimator and add some

16

structural stuff and something is going to get there,

17

and yeah, I'll talk about an industry, about some hotel

18

off a Nebraska highway, no one cares, but you know, the

19

results actually made sense.

20

And they don't care.

They just want

The question is, where is this research going?

21

Now, I don't want to rule this out, because this is a

22

big ticket item.

23

think really the positive spin on it -- in really

24

building, you know, a structural dynamic model of an

25

evolution -- structural dynamic model of the evolution

If people can succeed -- and this is I
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of industry, to hell with these case studies.

2

got your tool, right?

3

any policy scenario, and you could figure out, you know,

4

where things are going, what you ought to be doing, and

5

that is your guidance.

6

You have

You just use this, run through

Well, you know, we've tried that with Keynesian

7

models (ph), we have tried that with rational

8

expectations, we have tried that with real business

9

cycles, you know, in a sense it's a parallel to macro

10

that we are really going to figure out in a big picture

11

way analytically how markets behave, industries behave,

12

and that will be your guidance for policy.

13

So, you know, that's where it's going.

14

intersecting I think small case studies will build up,

15

it is not doing thing in terms of big picture facts,

16

even motivating what's going on, what people view to

17

within industry seems to be more the availability of

18

data and possible consistency with the analytics they

19

want to pursue.

20

It's not

All right, so, you know, where does that leave

21

us?

Well, you know, there are three ways to go, and to

22

some extent you can pursue them simultaneously, you

23

know, you can think about first looking more what the IO

24

field is doing, the general model, that kind of work, or

25

I would say more constructively try to focus that kind
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of work on the types of problems that you are interested

2

in.

3

The case evidence, I guess, you know, my concern

4

there is just whether it's accumulating, is it likely to

5

accumulate, because otherwise it won't be all that

6

helpful.

7

evidence that just don't seem to bind together to tell

8

you anything in general.

9

You will continue to just have patches of

My interest is really going back to the first

10

one, which was abandoned, and probably for good reason,

11

is getting broad summary measures -- welfare measures of

12

industries, conservation measures is obviously one, and

13

work on quantifying the welfare loss from monopoly --

14

and that line of research obviously had its problems --

15

but there was a start of work I remember by Bobby

16

Willig, Dansby and Willig on trying to come up with

17

industry performance measures that I thought was

18

promising, but I think it went out very quickly as

19

people turned over to conduct, and so that work never

20

went anywhere.

21

But I think that it might be useful to think, at

22

least in some way, along those lines for this agency.

23

There are broad ways of gauging industry performance,

24

you know, is there really something systematically wrong

25

with what is going on with U.S. industry?

Are we seeing
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anything that is now, you know, sort of really

2

threatening a $13 trillion economy, or, okay, there are

3

some bad guys, we know that, every once in a while

4

certain things are going to go on, but the truth is

5

markets are self-correcting, the world is getting more

6

competitive all the time, you know, what do we have to

7

do?

8
9
10

I would not say at this point we're ready to say
where to go.

I would just sort of step back and reflect

on various approaches and see what makes the most sense.

11

(Applause.)

12

MR. HEYER:

Okay, we are about to take our

13

break.

14

be some remarks and discussion involving two of the

15

other panelists, Dave Reitman and Bob Marshall.

16

encourage people to think during the break about maybe

17

picking up a little bit on what Cliff ended with some

18

and other comments that were made about, say, the issue

19

of empirical anecdotes and what can be generalized from

20

them or not, should we be focusing more on case-by-case

21

analyses, or is there some kind of broader policy

22

guidance we can learn from the empirical work?

23
24
25

We are going to be joined afterwards, there will

I would

Anyway, let's take our break, and we will come
back -- what, 15 minutes?
COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

About 15 minutes.
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MR. HEYER:

Fifteen minutes, all right.

2

(A brief recess was taken.)

3

MR. HEYER:

4

The way we thought we would do it is Dave

Okay, so let's resume.

5

Reitman and Bob Marshall are going to give short

6

presentations before we get into what hopefully will

7

begin with a round table discussion where maybe some of

8

the panelists and the discussants will comment on what

9

went on this morning and respond to one another,

10

elaborate on one another's comments, and then if we run

11

out of things to talk about, Bill and I will have a lot

12

of important questions as well.

13

So, we will begin with Dave Reitman.

Usually

14

when people introduce others they say, "It's a pleasure

15

to introduce so and so," even if they don't know them

16

from a bar of soap.

17

introduce because I know him very well, and he is

18

relatively soft-spoken but incredibly talented

19

economist, and he has one other thing that makes him a

20

particularly valuable addition to this panel, I think,

21

is that unlike most of us who have done a lot of maybe

22

talking and thinking about some of the issues that are

23

raised by the topic, Dave has worked in the trenches on

24

them.

25

Dave is a pleasure for me to

He was the Government's expert witness in U.S.
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v. Dentsply and did an extraordinary amount of both

2

theoretical and empirical work on that case in the

3

course of testifying, and he also did a great deal of

4

empirical work in support of our experts in the American

5

Airlines case, which, sadly, never actually got to

6

trial, but I'd be interested in Dave's comments both

7

general and specific on these issues.

8

Dave?

9

DR. REITMAN:

10

Thanks, Ken.

As Ken suggested, I just want to give a few

11

comments today as an antitrust practitioner about the

12

value of empirical tools, empirical work, in presenting

13

an antitrust case.

14

to the panel this morning that in doing a case, often we

15

are really talking about exceptions, that even if you're

16

convinced that exclusive dealing 90 percent of the time

17

or 99 percent of the time is beneficial, leads to lower

18

prices and some of the things Luke had in his slides,

19

still we're looking for the exceptions at the time when

20

it's used as a deterrent device or an exclusionary

21

device, and so the question is, what kinds of tools can

22

you bring to bear when you are looking at a specific

23

firm in a specific industry and a specific practice?

24
25

It's really become clear listening

Again, as Ken said, my background, my tenure at
the DOJ, I was involved in two extremely lengthy
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litigated Section 2 cases, and both of them involved a

2

fair bit of empirical work.

3

think there was a tremendous amount of empirical support

4

for a variety of elements of the case, and then

5

Dentsply, the Government ended up commissioning a survey

6

to try to measure some of the effects that were going on

7

in that market.

8
9

American Airlines, I really

Now, if you look just at those two cases, you
have to say that neither of those was a great

10

testimonial as to the value of empirical work actually

11

going forward and presenting the case.

12

I said, there was all this empirical evidence brought to

13

bear, and yet the case never made it past the summary

14

judgment phase.

15

and the analysis based on it was presented at the

16

District Court level.

17

out the survey as being unreliable and decided against

18

the Government.

19

Circuit, which without the benefit of the empirical

20

evidence, was nevertheless able to reverse the decision

21

and decide in favor of the Government.

22

In American, as

In Dentsply, the survey was presented

The District Court Judge threw

Then the case was appealed to the Third

So, you might look at that and say, it doesn't

23

seem like the empirical evidence contributed much.

24

There are other cases along those lines that you could

25

point to in recent years where you would say it's not
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clear that you really need to have the empirical pieces

2

in there.

3

look at the LePage's case, where a lot of the

4

commentators looking at that have said, it really would

5

be nice if we had more evidence here, more data, so we

6

could decide between these competing theories on whether

7

this is procompetitive or anticompetitive.

8

Solicitor General on the cert petition before the

9

Supreme Court really echoed the same things, we really

So, just to give one more example, if you

The

10

would just like more information, and yet the plaintiff

11

was able to present that case and win it without having

12

done the kinds of empirical things that the commentators

13

would have liked.

14

So, I'd like to just spend a few minutes looking

15

at the American case and the Dentsply case and talk

16

about what really is the value of going through and

17

doing the empirical exercise, and it may be just by the

18

magic of self-selection that in this room we're kind of

19

preaching to the choir, but nevertheless...

20

Let's start with the American Airlines case.

21

The airline industry is one where companies involved

22

collect a lot of data themselves and the Government

23

collects a lot of data.

24

of data that's been a mainstay of the empirical IO

25

literature, and so it's only natural that a

So, there's a tremendous amount
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monopolization case involving the airline industry would

2

have a lot of empirical work in it.

3

The Government's main expert in this case, Steve

4

Berry, is a preeminent empirical IO economist, and he

5

brought, as I said, empirical evidence on virtually

6

every point made, and a lot of that is not in the public

7

record, as there was no trial, but just to give a sense

8

of the scope of the empirical effort, you may recall

9

that what turned out to be the Government's main test

10

for predation when the case went up for appeal was what

11

was called Test 4, which suggests that there are at

12

least three and maybe a lot of other tests that

13

economists turn to to try to find the right way to take

14

the data and to sort it out and to say this is the right

15

way to classify what is predatory and what is not.

16

So, what, again, is the value of having that

17

empirical test for predation?

And to answer that, let

18

me just go back a little bit farther in time.

19

after I started at the Justice Department, Joel Klein

20

came aboard as Deputy Assistant Attorney General, and he

21

was making the rounds to the different sections to

22

introduce himself, and when he came to EAG, one thing I

23

remember from his presentation was he quoted from "The

24

Four Quartets" by T.S. Eliot, and he quoted, "We shall

25

not cease from exploration, and the end of all of our

Not long
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exploring will be to arrive where we started and know

2

the place for the first time."

3

I actually have no idea at this point what

4

Joel's point was for quoting that, but it does seem to

5

apply nicely to the American case.

6

happened, the basic story never changed from the very

7

beginning, before the complaint was filed, which was

8

American added a bunch of flights and routes where it

9

competed against low cost carriers and drove them out of

The theory of what

10

the market, but the understanding of the way that

11

mechanism worked, really why it worked and what it was,

12

really only evolved by really years of wrestling with

13

the data and trying to get a handle on what was going

14

on, and so the end, when we looked at sort of the final

15

presentations and the appellate memos, we said that the

16

Justice Department really seemed to know what they were

17

talking about and what they thought had happened, which

18

was that American Airlines was able to, by adding

19

flights, was able to take demand away from its competing

20

low-cost carriers in a way that it simply couldn't do by

21

lowering prices or by removing fare restrictions, but

22

the cost of that was to reduce load factors and push

23

American up to that increasing part of the marginal cost

24

curve to the point where the incremental cost of adding

25

these additional flights was above both the average cost
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of serving the route as a whole and also the incremental

2

revenues received from the passengers.

3

So, there's a test that, you know, when you

4

arrive back at the place you started, you understand it,

5

and I certainly don't want this panel to start to brew

6

up a fight about whether that was a right theory or

7

whether there really was harm there.

8

that we really didn't understand what we were saying,

9

what we had, until that process of wrestling with the

The only point is

10

data, really getting into it and being able to say, this

11

is the test, which at least for this company in this

12

industry in these markets is able to distinguish what

13

looks like predatory behavior from all the other routes

14

they had, which, you know, generated essentially no

15

false positives.

16

So, anyway, whether that's a legal analysis is

17

for the courts to decide, but that was the value of the

18

test there.

19

If we could turn to the Dentsply case, which is

20

sort of toward the other extreme in terms of the amount

21

of data available, this is a market where exclusive

22

dealing had been used for at least 15 years.

23

the kinds of things Luke was saying earlier, we looked

24

around for what we could use as a natural experiment,

25

and one thing that may be a potential was to compare the

Following
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policy in this country with other countries, but that

2

was ruled out fairly early on by the Court.

3

left with not a whole lot of empirical evidence to go

4

on.

So, we were

5

To fill in the gap, what the Government

6

commissioned was a survey of dental labs, which are the

7

consumers of the dental teeth that were subject to

8

exclusive dealing, and among other things, the survey

9

asked respondents how they would choose among brands of

10

teeth given various prices and distribution

11

combinations, and so from those responses, you can then

12

map out demand, service, and estimate or quantify what

13

the anticompetitive effects were from the exclusive

14

dealing policy both in terms of pricing and in terms of

15

market shares, and that quantification was important.

16

Dentsply has been characterized by some as, you

17

know, as an easy case, or as in Luke's slide this

18

morning, it's one where the aggressive behavior was bad

19

in the proximate term and bad in the distant term,

20

right?

21

all around is because the District Court ruled that the

22

procompetitive explanation and justification that

23

Dentsply put forward was pretextual.

24
25

But the only reason we're able to say it was bad

If you look at the case before the decision,
before the trial, before even the decision to bring the
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case, it's not at all implausible that exclusive dealing

2

would have some advantages in aligning the incentives of

3

Dentsply with its dealers and that that would generate

4

some benefits.

5

that Dentsply eventually put forward seemed to be

6

inconsistent with the facts, and so given how long

7

exclusive dealing had been in the market, it was tough

8

to be able to say how much competition would benefit by

9

removing the restrictions on dealers, or to say that the

You may recall the particular mechanism

10

benefit from eliminating competition or eliminating the

11

restriction would be larger than these amorphous

12

benefits from aligned incentives without some sort of

13

systematic study of customer preferences.

14

As it turned out in the case, of course, the

15

weighing -- it turned out -- it proved to be easy,

16

because we could sort of rule out procompetitive

17

benefits, but more generally, looking forward, there's

18

almost always going to be this kind of possible

19

trade-offs between the procompetitive and

20

anticompetitive story, and some quantification is vital

21

in determining that effect.

22

So, that leads to a third benefit of empirical

23

analysis in looking at these kinds of monopolist

24

practices, which is just in terms of lending conviction

25

about understanding what really happened or what we
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1

think is happening in that particular market.

We could

2

talk about this both in the context of American and

3

Dentsply, but I am going to stick to Dentsply, because

4

as Ken said, I was a testifying expert in this case, and

5

I suppose as a testifier, there is not a huge difference

6

between saying what could have been happening in a

7

market and what did happen.

8

disparate evidence you gather from different sources and

9

try to piece it together in unified whole, which gives

In both cases, the

10

you the best plausible explanation of what was going on

11

in the market, but at least for me, it made a great deal

12

of difference in crossing over from could have happened

13

to it did happen to be able to actually see that effect

14

quantified in the survey data.

15

That is to say, my conviction that Dentsply's

16

dealer criterion had actually harmed competition was

17

crystallized just by being able to see it in the numbers

18

after analyzing the consumer preferences that came out

19

of the survey that had been commissioned, and it

20

crystallized it in a way that I wouldn't have been able

21

to achieve just by looking at documents and depositions

22

and all the other evidence, even though all of that

23

other stuff was consistent with the same conclusion.

24

Now, of course, the lessons we drew from the

25

survey were not uncontested and will never be
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1

uncontested in this manner of case, and the level of

2

conviction didn't seem to make much difference to the

3

District Court, since they concluded that the survey

4

itself was unreliable, but I do have to believe that the

5

whole testimony was made stronger by having conviction

6

about key parts of it that were reinforced by the survey

7

and that empirical evidence contributed a great deal to

8

that sense of conviction.

9

So, that's really all I wanted to say as sort of

10

a little ode to the value of empirical research in these

11

cases.

12

eulogy, but there's value in knowing what you have,

13

value in having confidence in that, and then just being

14

able to quantify how much difference it makes in

15

competition, and those things are not always going to

16

carry the day, like they didn't in these two cases, but

17

they are nevertheless important to preserve for future

18

cases.

Hopefully, not a eulogy, I don't think it's a

19

Thanks.

20

(Applause.)

21

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

22

Our last presenter before we turn to a

Thank you, David.

23

discussion is Bob Marshall, who heads the economics

24

department at Penn State and co-directs ITS Center For

25

the Study of Auctions, Procurements and Competition
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1

Policy.

2

that time as a partner at Bates White.

3

Bob's on leave this year.

He's serving during

Our interest in asking Bob to come today, again,

4

is related to a major strain of his own research.

He

5

frequently has married both empirical work and theory, a

6

great deal of it dealing with auctions, procurement and

7

collusion.

8

that might be derived from that body of work for

9

dominant firm behavior.

Bob's going to tell us a bit about lessons

10

Bob.

11

DR. MARSHALL:

Thank you, Bill.

If you got too

12

flowery, I knew that means you would be late with some

13

of the things you owe me as a co-author, so it's good to

14

hear that it didn't get out of hand.

15

a brief overview and then I will get into some of the

16

slides.

17

I am going to give

So, I do a lot of thinking about cartels and

18

cartel behavior, so I understand Section 2 is not about

19

cartels, but a cartel is like, I would argue in many

20

cases, a single dominant firm, and cartels often go

21

beyond just the suppression of interfirm rivalry in

22

their actions.

23

of things where they go into behaviors that we would

24

think about as Section 2 violations.

25

going to try to do here is tell a compelling story that

In fact, I am going to show you a number

So, what we are
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1

we can get some window into understanding Section 2

2

through the behavior of cartels, and hopefully there's

3

some additional tractability in terms of empirical

4

analysis that comes from that.

5

So, that's the gist.

So, there's some fundamental difficulties of

6

Section 2 analysis.

So, benchmarks are real important

7

in terms of doing analyses particularly of cartel

8

behavior.

9

time, for example, when firms are acting in a

We like to think we have got a period of

10

noncollusive manner, and then we can look at this other

11

time period of alleged conduct to see what's going on.

12

With ongoing dominant firm behavior, that's often not

13

there, and that creates some difficulties with doing

14

Section 2 type analyses.

15

Then there's an issue of what is legal and what

16

is not for a dominant firm, and that usually doesn't

17

arise in the analysis of cartels.

18

suppresses interfirm rivalry and then it goes off and

19

predates and then it goes off and engages in exclusive

20

dealing, no one calls us to say, "Well, I wonder if that

21

predation was really predation or if the exclusive

22

dealing was really exclusive dealing of an

23

anticompetitive nature."

24

cartels function under when they get together to

25

suppress interfirm rivalry is to suppress competition.

When a cartel

The fundamental premise that
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1

So, when they engage in these behaviors, it's somewhat

2

doubtful to think that they're thinking about some

3

social good that is not about suppressing competition.

4

So, I have already explained that we can think

5

of a cartel as being something like a single dominant

6

firm, and they can be highly heterogenous.

7

struggling to maintain internal cohesion and stability.

8

Defections might be occurring; finding a mechanism that

9

works may be difficult.

Some are

For others, those things might

10

be easy to attain and settle in very quickly.

11

central goal is the elevation of prices and profits, but

12

then we see these other behaviors that start to merge,

13

and I will go through examples, predation, blocking of

14

entry, exclusive dealing, bundling, tying.

15

of cartel behavior.

16

The

Again, part

So, there's some interesting empirical questions

17

that are immediately posing themselves here.

Why do

18

some cartels engage in these Section 2 like violations

19

but others don't?

20

at this through the lens of cartels?

21

rich discovery record typically in place for some

22

cartels because they got busted, and because a lot of

23

them got busted, it means that we're able to look at

24

starting dates, ending dates, and we're able to say, Oh,

25

okay, so this is when the behavior began; this is when

And what's the advantage of looking
Well, there is a
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1

it ended.

2

this is when it ended.

3

behavior began; this is when it ended.

4

This is when the antirivalry behavior began;
This is when the monopolization

Now, you may say, well, perhaps those things are

5

coincident and difficult to separate, the antirivalry

6

behavior and the Section 2 behavior.

7

what we will see as we look through some of these cases

8

that I'll pose here is that the anti-rivalry behavior is

9

the first thing that happens.

A lot of times

You have got to get that

10

set up first when there's running of a cartel.

It's

11

then later, as the cartel reaches some maturity, that it

12

starts to investigate other sources of profit, and

13

that's where we get to the Section 2 violations.

14

I do this when I teach my "Economics and

15

Collusion" course at Penn State.

16

Five Forces.

17

Business School 101, so let me explain why I put this

18

diagram up and what it is.

19

competition that affect a firm's profits.

20

from Michael Porter's competitive strategy book.

21

These are Porter's

Now, in business school, this is basically

These are the five forces of
So, this is

In the middle of this diagram is interfirm

22

rivalry.

For some reason I have been told not to refer

23

to that as the green zone, but in the green is the

24

interfirm rivalry, okay?

25

be, differentiated product/price competition, whatever

So, this is whatever it may
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1

this may be that's limiting profitability among the

2

competitors in the industry.

3

Now, what are these other four forces on the

4

perimeter?

Well, at the top we have threat of new

5

entry; on the right, bargaining power of buyers; down

6

below, whether the goods produced by the firms in the

7

industry have substitutes or compliments; and on the

8

left, the bargaining power of suppliers.

9

a lot of substitutability, we have a lot of entry

So, if we have

10

possibility, et cetera, well, profits are going to get

11

hurt by that, and if we don't have those things, profits

12

will be helped.

13

So, I would argue the following:

Cartels at

14

their initiation work on the green zone, they are

15

limiting interfirm rivalry.

16

violation.

17

often venture out into the blue zone.

18

Section 2; green is Section 1.

19

that diagram.

20

That's the Section 1

Once they get that nailed down, they then
So, blue is

That's the way I view

So, I want to talk about some examples here, and

21

this is all based, by the way, on a co-authored paper

22

with my co-author Randy Heeb and Leslie Marks (ph),

23

who's at Duke University, and Randy is at the Bates

24

White office here.

25

monopolization behavior from recent cartel cases?

So, what are the examples of
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1

am going to give you five cases, four listed here and I

2

will read another one, and that's not a recent one.

3

had to go back to Stocking and Watkins and pick up

4

another example from there.

5

But let's start with citric acid.

I

So, this is

6

vitamins in training is a way you could view citric

7

acid.

8

the vitamins cartel.

9

the history of Section 1 violations.

The guy who ran citric acid was promoted to run
So, this is an important cartel in
And, of course,

10

what they're trying to do, these firms, is suppress

11

interfirm rivalry.

12

Commission decision regarding what part of the action,

13

part of the conduct of the citric acid cartel.

14

were very bothered by entry by Chinese manufacturers,

15

particularly into the European community, so those

16

customers who were buying from the Chinese were

17

targeted, and there were specific predation against the

18

Chinese targeted at those customers.

19

undercut those customers, and this list of customers was

20

referred to as the Serbian list, and then there was

21

frequent discussions that went on about how that

22

predation activity was progressing.

23

This is a section from the European

So, they

They were going to

Now, when you read stuff like this in European

24

Commission decisions, it becomes very clear very quickly

25

it's not just about the suppression of rivalry amongst
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1

themselves.

2

members of the cartel, they start to reach out into

3

other mechanisms that they could use to increase

4

profitability.

5

Once they have got that nailed down, as

Carbon brushes, this is also a story about

6

predation, and I'll just go to the next slide quickly

7

and show you a particular example on German

8

reunification.

9

and there was a pesky little noncartel firm, and so two

There was an East German company, EKL,

10

strategies were agreed.

11

cartel would supply any graphite to EKL, that's the

12

basic raw material in making a carbon brush, the block,

13

carbon block, and EKL would be denied any market share

14

by systematically undercutting it with all customers, so

15

that it would not be able to sell anywhere.

16

taken over by one of the cartel members in 1997.

17

targeted predation at a noncartel firm.

18

None of the members of the

EKL was

Now, keep in mind, again, this is a cartel that

19

begins and ends.

20

predating the beginning of the cartel behavior.

21

have got the antirivalry behavior, that gets

22

established, that gets set in place, then the

23

monopolization behavior begins, okay?

24
25

Again,

This predation begins in '92, well
So, we

Then there is also things like standardization.
The cartel implements a ban on advertising, not to
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1

advertise or participate in sales exhibitions.

2

In vitamins, agreed-upon elimination of

3

competitors, and in this case, we're buying out

4

competitors, Coors, that's the folks who make beer, and

5

we're -- the two major cartel members here, Roche and

6

BASF, are racking up the purchase price in proportion to

7

their market shares.

8

The European Commission goes on to talk about

9

the use of the bundling of the basic vitamins into

10

premixes as another mechanism by which the cartel

11

predated against downstream blenders, so you have to

12

look -- you have to understand a little bit of what

13

happens here.

14

Hogs and chickens and cattle get fed a premix of

15

vitamins, and there were groups in the marketplace who

16

would actually mix the vitamins together and sell the

17

premixes to be added to the feed, and so to eliminate

18

those pesky competitors in the downstream market, strong

19

actions were taken by Roche and BASF to drive them out.

20

The European Commission notes in particular, if

21

you go to the second bullet here, it says, "In

22

addition," referring to Roche and BASF, "they enjoyed

23

greater flexibility to structure prices, promotions and

24

discounts and had a much greater potential for tying."

25

Again, we are not talking about just the suppression of
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1

interfirm rivalry here.

2

violations now.

3

We are well into Section 2

Sorbates, we're talking here about -- this is

4

another European Commission decision -- the blocking of

5

entry to the marketplace.

6

pulled something from Stocking and Watkins regarding

7

General Electric and the incandescent electric lamp

8

cartel.

9

exclusive contracts with the manufacturers of

And then I went back and just

Together with other lamp manufacturers, it made

10

lamp-making machinery and in bulbs and tubing, binding

11

them to sell goods exclusively to General Electric and

12

the companies associated with it or to sell to competing

13

companies only at discriminatory prices.

14

part of the action of the cartel.

15

So, this is

So, let me just as an aside say, standing issues

16

about cartels are confusion to me at this point.

17

Noncartel firms don't have standing because they are

18

always the beneficiaries of cartel behavior.

19

a bit odd to me just an aside here given the fact that

20

these Section 2 violations are existing, well documented

21

in the record, with regard to the noncartel firms, but

22

that's just an aside.

That seems

23

I would just like to say that I think that this

24

is a rich avenue for potential empirical investigation,

25

again, because we have got clear benchmarks in place.
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1

We can also get a clear look at the discovery record

2

associated with cartel behavior and start to see when

3

these kind of behaviors, the Section 2 violations, are

4

implemented by the cartels, look across industries,

5

cartels in different industries, and see who was doing

6

these kind of activities, which industries are not

7

engaged in those kind of activities.

8

I'm hopeful that this illuminates as a potential

9

or at least gets investigated as a potential some of

10

these ambiguities that have existed in the past with

11

just looking at single dominant firms as being the

12

source of data and empirical inference.

13

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

14

(Applause.)

15

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

Thank you, Bob.

Before we have the more

16

open-ended discussion among all the panelists, I'd like

17

to give our first four presenters an opportunity simply

18

to comment on what took place or to add additional

19

thoughts that came to mind.

20

the order again, go with Mike, Luke, Jon and Cliff?

21

Mike?

22

DR. SCHERER:

23
24
25

Could I simply go through

Well, lots of things I found

stimulating, so I'll have to be very, very selective.
I think the thing that struck me most was
Cliff's distinction between the European Union and the
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1

United States.

2

there.

3

There are two points I'd like to make

One is a puzzlement; one I think I understand.
It's been said by several of the panelists that

4

the European Union has been more aggressive in some

5

sense towards dominant firms.

6

pursue an abuse of dominance standard, whereas our

7

approach has been mainly structural combined with some

8

elements of conduct.

9

They have tended to

On the other hand, the Europeans have been

10

severely limited because when they tried to go against

11

abuse, as in, for example, the Hoffmann-La Roche Valium

12

case and the Volkswagen case, they ran into big troubles

13

ascertaining what an abusively high price was or an

14

abusively high level of profits was, and in this sense,

15

they are going back to the caveats that Judge Taft

16

expressed in the Addyston Pipe case more than a century

17

ago, but I think there's something else going on.

18

I think the ghost of Friedrich Hayek haunts the

19

Europeans in the sense that Hayek argues that you simply

20

cannot tell what an abusive price is.

21

community ran into this squarely in Microsoft.

22

were unwilling -- at least initially, they realized in

23

the end they had to -- but they were unwilling initially

24

to state the fees that Microsoft could command for

25

licenses to its intraoperability information.

The European
They

And even
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1

more seriously, when they required the provision by

2

Microsoft of an unbundled version of Windows without the

3

media player, they allowed Microsoft to sell both

4

products at an identical price.

5

would have been to set a price differential, but they

6

refrained and have continued to refrain from doing this,

7

and therefore, virtually no one has taken the unbundled

8

version when you could get a more complete version.

9

The obvious thing to do

The Europeans have a serious problem.

When you

10

look at our past compulsory licensing cases, you see we

11

were much more willing to intervene and said, "Here's

12

the reasonable royalty that you can command."

13

Now, the other thing about the Europeans is

14

this:

15

1965 and then the book by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber

16

and then another conference in Germany in 1976, and God

17

knows what else, the Europeans have adopted the policy

18

of encouraging large dominant national champion

19

enterprises with the express purpose of competing with

20

the United States technologically.

21

they have failed.

22

Beginning with a conference at Fontainebleau in

In most respects,

In most areas of modern technology, they have

23

lagged the United States, and partly I think because we,

24

on the one hand, following the sage advice of Chairman

25

Mao, have encouraged 100 flowers to bloom.

The
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1

Europeans have tried to cultivate their national

2

champions, and they just didn't have the diversity

3

required to achieve technological innovations.

4

exception was in a couple of high-scale economy

5

industries.

6

plants, and the other is the provision of aircraft,

7

although they are having trouble there now, too, but for

8

a while, Airbus was doing very, very well.

9

The big

One is the provision of nuclear power

I think there really are important lessons to be

10

learned here, and they need to be studied much more

11

carefully than they have been thus far.

12

A point that Luke made, and I think Bill Kovacic

13

made it, too, and it is very, very important, that we

14

should be doing follow-up studies on areas in which we

15

have intervened.

16

The FTC specifically commissioned a study by Tim

17

Bresnahan of the results of the Xerox case, which found

18

that it had been quite beneficial.

19

study by David Kearns in a book entitled Prophets in the

20

Dark.

21

which was facilitated by the FTC intervention, had a

22

remarkably salutary effect on prices, reliability and

23

technical change in the copying machine industry.

24
25

We did this, among others, in Xerox.

Xerox did its own

It found that the entry of Japanese competition,

Let me end with one footnote on the marginal
paper, vitamins.

I happened to be a consultant for
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1

Eisai in the vitamin E case.

One should not look into

2

these things without taking into account international

3

trade rules and how they shape the framework within

4

which international agreements appear.

5

the case of Eisai, Eisai was a newcomer to the vitamin E

6

market.

7

markets, and the chairman of Eisai was called into a

8

meeting by the head of Hoffmann-La Roche's vitamins

9

operation and was told, I quote exactly, "If you yellow

Specifically, in

They began entering the U.S. and European

10

bastards don't join our cartel, we will drive you out of

11

both the U.S. market and the European market with

12

antidumping suits."

13

What happened after then is very complex, but

14

there remains in my mind at least a puzzle.

I couldn't

15

find any change in Eisai's pricing behavior after they

16

allegedly joined the cartel.

17

that changed is that they began shipping more of their

18

output to China and they began dumping their excess

19

output in China.

20

because China was growing rapidly or that was a cartel

21

facilitating device, I do not know.

22

interesting stories here to be explored.

The one thing observable

Why, I don't know, whether it was

23

Thank you.

24

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

25

Luke?

There are

Thank you, Mike.
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1
2

DR. FROEB:

Thanks.

I just want to say a couple

of things.

3

First of all, to talk about Jon Baker comments

4

about how to balance the good proximate effects against

5

the bad distant ones, and there's two ways to do that,

6

you know, empirically or use some kind of model,

7

theoretical model that helps you do that, and if you

8

kind of contrast the way we balance horizontal, you

9

know, efficiencies against unilateral effects, we have

10

well-developed models that allow us to make the

11

trade-off.

12

models that would allow us to make those kinds of

13

trade-offs, and furthermore, if we held our prosecutions

14

of these Section 2 cases to the same levels or same

15

standards that we did our merger cases, I mean, I think

16

it would be very difficult to bring good cases in those

17

instances.

I just don't know of any well-developed

18

I want to talk a little bit about what Cliff

19

Winston said about where is the empirical literature

20

going.

21

their technological expertise by building structural

22

models and, you know, trying to estimate them, and they

23

ignore, you know, trying to figure out, well, what's the

24

effect of things like Wal-Mart entry, you know, what is

25

Wal-Mart doing or what -- doing follow-up studies,

In economics, young IO economists demonstrate
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1

because they seem so pedestrian, yeah, anybody can do

2

that, you know, you just have to gather the evidence

3

and, you know, control for competing factors, and so

4

there's a natural bias in the economics literature

5

favoring, you know, structural technical modeling, even

6

when it's not appropriate, and we see that a lot.

7

think that is one reason for the dearth of good

8

empirical evidence in industrial organization, because

9

we have this fetish almost with structural modeling.

10

I want to agree with what Cliff Winston said

I

11

also about the real problem is, you know, empirically,

12

you know, antitrust cleaning up trade, regulatory or

13

lousy patent policy.

14

recent acts at the FTC bringing a lot of cases that

15

wouldn't exist but for the people abusing the patent

16

system, or I remember when I was back at the DOJ, we

17

challenged a merger between Westinghouse and GE in

18

electrical generators because Toshiba was out of the

19

market because they had been selling machine equipment

20

to the Russians to make submarines, so the Commerce

21

Department said, "Hey, you can't bid on electrical

22

generators in the United States," and that, you know,

23

would have made the merger okay, but, you know, we

24

blocked the merger because they were out of the market.

25

I mean, when you look at the

I want to note that Dave Reitman's Dentsply
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case, he was able to estimate the proximate effect.

2

wasn't able to estimate the distant effect, which wasn't

3

an issue in the trial because the judge said, "Hey,

4

there's no possible, you know, beneficial effect of

5

these exclusionary practices," but he was able to

6

estimate the proximate effect, not the distant one, and

7

I think the real challenge empirically is on these

8

distant effects, these indirect strategic effects.

9

He

I think that's all I want to say, and -- well, I

10

guess I would say to Bob, when you see these vertical

11

restraints in these cartels, I mean, suppose I form a

12

cartel upstream and I buy some downstream or put the

13

downstream guys out of business or refuse to deal with

14

them, I mean, there are certainly procompetitive

15

justifications for that given that you have a cartel.

16

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

17

DR. MULLIN:

Wally?

I would like to pick up on this

18

interplay between economic research, whether done at the

19

university or a think tank, and antitrust practice.

20

I've neither done any antitrust cases nor have I

21

estimated a discrete choice demand system.

22

guess you can imagine talking about developing clinical

23

facts, which a judge or even an antitrust enforcement

24

agency might think are too bound up in the particular

25

circumstances to really be admissible.

So,

However, I
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I mean, if you said, okay, here are three or

2

four or five not tools but three or four or five, you

3

know, examples favors saying there's predation, is that

4

going to mean that the American case doesn't survive a

5

summary judgment?

I don't know.

I would be doubtful.

6

The argument I guess in favor of some sort of

7

methodology, right, is that, yeah, if the tool works,

8

then you can use it in lots of arenas.

9

quickly, so it's not a Section 2 example, but my sense

Operating very

10

is that a lot of mergers involve firms that produce

11

differentiated products.

12

1975 on estimating those models was not great.

13

Levinsohn Pakes (BLP) offered a big methodological

14

improvement.

15

problems with the standard approach.

16

under the rug and BLP took on a very difficult problem.

17

So, from their papers you can say, okay, well, I don't

18

just know something more about the automobile industry,

19

I can use this in other settings.

20

The state of the art circa
Berry

Previously, the profession knew there were
We just kicked it

I guess the question that I have heard others

21

raise in other contexts in terms of the way the

22

industrial organization field has gone in certain

23

universities is whether -- maybe we did need to make

24

progress on the demand side and now have a better sense

25

of how to estimate demand, but we're industrial
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organization economists.

We study also the supply side,

2

at least at this point in the development of the

3

literature, it cannot yet say okay, here are some tools

4

in terms of supply that would allow you to make these

5

sort of counterfactual predictions.

6

this particular exclusive dealing isn't available, this

7

is how the market will change and this is how firms will

8

operate differently, which is a real cost of pursuing

9

models on motels in Nebraska or something like that.

For example, if

10

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

Thanks, Wally.

11

Jon?

12

DR. BAKER:

13

First of all, I need to be a law professor for a

Thanks, Bill, a couple quick things.

14

moment.

15

Section 2, what he really is saying is a distinction

16

between conduct that's collusive and exclusionary.

17

Probably you would attack all of that conduct in the

18

context of the cartel cases that Bob was referring to.

19

The exclusionary conduct, you would probably attack it

20

under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, not Section 2.

21

when we're talking about monopolization under Sherman

22

Act Section 2, typically the conduct is exclusionary,

23

and so that's why Bob thinks it's instructive to look at

24

the exclusionary conduct for the cartels.

25

When Bob Marshall talked about Section 1 and

I actually think there's a close connection
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between exclusionary conduct and collusive conduct,

2

because you can think of exclusionary conduct as

3

creating an involuntary cartel or a coerced cartel.

4

Think about it this way:

5

to collude with a fringe rival, a prospective entrant or

6

whatever, but the rival doesn't go along, so the

7

dominant firm has to force the fringe rival or

8

prospective entrant to compete less aggressively, cut

9

back on output, not expand, whatever it would require,

The dominant firm would like

10

and it does that with a panoply of exclusionary

11

techniques, raising rivals' costs, reducing their access

12

to the market or whatever, and the result is that

13

industry output falls below the competitive level, not

14

by voluntary agreement among the firms the way a cartel

15

would, but essentially by coercing the maverick.

16

an involuntary cartel; that is how I like to think of

17

it.

It's

So, they are closely connected.

18

My other comment on the conversation we have had

19

here, have had today, is about the problems of assessing

20

the "but-for" world.

21

several people here, Bob and Wally and Mike I think all

22

alluded to it, and probably everyone else did, too.

23

make this concrete, I started to think about the Intel

24

case that the FTC brought in 1998, which was when I was

25

bureau director.

That was brought up I think by

To

It was settled in 1999 I think after I
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had left, and it's the case that Mike was referring to

2

where he was going to be the witness for the Federal

3

Trade Commission.

4

The basic idea was that Intel refused to deal

5

with certain customers, cutting off their access to

6

technical information about upcoming new microprocessor

7

products that the customers needed if they were going to

8

be able to design complimentary products like personal

9

computers, and they did all this as a way of coercing

10

the licensees -- or, I'm sorry -- yes, getting the

11

rivals to license their microprocessor technology to

12

Intel.

13

the rivals included Digital Equipment Corporation or

14

DEC, Intergraph and Compaq.

15

That was the story that the Commission told, and

So, Intel was trying to get leverage in

16

unrelated commercial disputes involving the scope of

17

competing intellectual property rights.

18

the case was that what Intel did to cut off these

19

customers from the technical information diminished the

20

incentives of those three Intel customers, as well as

21

all sorts of other firms that are similarly situated,

22

whether they are Intel customers or they are otherwise

23

dependent on Intel, to develop new innovations relating

24

to microprocessor technology.

25

The theory of

Just to give Intel's side of the story, they
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defended by saying that the conduct alleged in the

2

complaint didn't diminish the incentive of any firm to

3

develop new innovations of any kind.

4

dispute.

5

So, that was the

The case was settled with an agreement that

6

prohibited Intel from -- I wrote it down here --

7

impeding, altering, suspending, withdrawing, withholding

8

or refusing to provide access by any microprocessor

9

customer to -- oh, dear, I don't know what I wrote down

10

here -- some sort of information for reasons related to

11

intellectual property dispute with such customer -- et

12

cetera -- or basing any supply decisions for

13

general-purpose microprocessors upon the existence of an

14

intellectual property dispute.

15

So, the question is, all right, this case

16

against a big firm, it was technically a Section 5 case,

17

but it was basically a monopolization case, how do you

18

tell whether the consent made any difference?

19

the question I am trying to set up.

20

have to be that this consent encouraged rivals to

21

innovate in ways to take on Intel, and before they

22

didn't have the incentive to do that, and maybe that

23

makes sense.

That's

The theory would

24

I think that the kind of markets you're talking

25

about are winner-takes-most generally, and it's hard to
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believe that Intel wouldn't keep innovating in those

2

markets even if you did something to make it easier for

3

the rivals to innovate, too.

4

But how do you prove or disprove that theory?

5

We know that AMD, a key rival, has been successful in

6

the last couple of years, but that doesn't settle the

7

issue.

8

for" world and figure out how AMD would have done there.

9

We don't know whether AMD's success has anything to do

What we have to do is somehow construct a "but-

10

with this consent or not just from what I've recited as

11

the facts.

12

I guess what I am driven to, I'm not sure what

13

we would do.

14

is probably use Section 6(b) of the Federal Trade

15

Commission Act to review the R&D plans and the marketing

16

plans of Intel and AMD and the other firms before and

17

after the case, assuming all the documents are still

18

available, and depose key executives and see if Intel

19

and its rivals changed their strategies -- we could

20

probably find that out -- changed how they thought about

21

innovation, the kind of innovation they went after, what

22

they would do with them and the like.

23

I think the best we could practically do

The point of this exercise is that it shows how

24

hard it is to construct the "but-for" world in any

25

actual case in order to either figure out the violation
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in the first place, which was the point of some of my

2

colleagues here, or to evaluate how well we did in

3

bringing the case and remedying it.

4

I don't view this as a reason not to bring

5

cases, by the way, but I know that some people do.

6

That's my comment.

7

Go ahead, Cliff.

8

DR. WINSTON:

9

Just two brief things, and let me

sort of shape them more toward ultimately, what advice

10

do we give Bill and Ken?

11

will say, what should we do to make sense of all of

12

this?

13

Presumably at the end, they

You know, my comment on -- really about the

14

method -- the IO methodology is just more of a caution

15

about the difficulty of just focusing on, you know, can

16

we pull studies together and amass, you know, a core of

17

useful knowledge that way, and my caution was really

18

historical.

19

If we turn the pages back to the sixties, the

20

leading empirical enterprise of the day was basically

21

concentration and profit progression.

22

scores of those, and along with that was the policy

23

issue of, you know, should we have a deconcentration

24

policy in America as the focus for antitrust?

25

know, these studies evolved certainly from, you know,

I mean, there are

And, you
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noneconometric approaches, contingency tables and the

2

like, to more sophisticated econometric approaches, but

3

ultimately the enterprise basically collapsed, obviously

4

concerns of heterogeneity and concerns that, in the end,

5

the concentrated industry is the good one, this is a

6

good thing we should be having, and there's just none of

7

that around at all, and no one even sort of looks at

8

that for much guidance.

9

Dick Schmalensee I remember in The Handbook of

10

IO tried to summarize that and offered, you know, 20

11

stylized facts that sort of stretches what you get out

12

of it, and I'm concerned that, you know, in the sense

13

the empirical IO we have got today may go in the same

14

way for a somewhat different reason, but ultimately,

15

there is a somewhat destructive nature of the

16

enterprise.

17

extremely easy to raise the stakes at every -- you'd be

18

surprised.

19

It's extremely competitive, and it's

I mean, you know, at this point I would say BLP

20

has done a brilliant job of market share capturing,

21

nothing short of brilliant, among the best I have ever

22

seen of intellectual importers, and people think

23

naturally of, well, they have a nice demand system and

24

so on and so forth, but I think you will see, as certain

25

other papers come out, there are real cracks in even
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what they've got, you know, for every model for which

2

you want to try to capture heterogeneity, you can point

3

out why there are problems in the way they are doing it,

4

and so almost every study can be replied with that as

5

the methodology pushes harder and harder and harder and

6

excludes more and more people and almost makes it

7

virtually impossible to understand for a lot of people

8

in practice.

9

I'm just wondering where all of this ultimately

10

is going to go and thinking, well, we can use this

11

still, you know, the simplest thing is in courts, but we

12

can't, because obviously the other side is going to come

13

back and use more technical things and just smash what

14

you do, and so I am concerned about ultimately where all

15

this stuff is going to converge in a constructive way.

16

You know, that said, then, you know, what then

17

would I say to emphasize?

And I think this has been

18

touched on, but maybe not enough, and that is the

19

deterrence aspects of antitrust policy.

20

sometimes, you know, I am interpreted or at least my

21

paper with Crandall was interpreted saying we ought to

22

abolish antitrust intervention, and that's ridiculous,

23

we never said it, and I certainly don't believe it, but

24

the importance really of antitrust is in deterrence,

25

and, of course, that's your success story, but it's also

I mean,
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the most important and difficult thing to quantify.

2

So, the challenge, I would suggest, at this

3

point, where you could get help but certainly it's a

4

challenge at this point, is trying to find the areas

5

where there is evidence that we are clearly deterring

6

other areas, but what for going after Microsoft, who

7

would have known, all right, regardless of what people

8

think on that case, you know, other things that may be

9

done, and that may ultimately be the strength that a lot

10

of people think of antitrust and certainly the thing

11

that also needs to be emphasized and systematized, but

12

at this point, obviously, that's eluded our ability to

13

do that kind of thing.

14

MR. HEYER:

Well, I want to give at least -- if

15

Dave and Bob want to say a couple of words.

16

we can throw out some very insightful, stimulating

17

questions.

18
19

DR. REITMAN:

Well, we could end up looping

quite a bit here if we go round and round, but --

20

DR. MARSHALL:

21

DR. REITMAN:

22

MR. HEYER:

23

Otherwise,

Fire away.
Yeah.

Well, you guys can respond first

maybe.

24

I had one question I alluded to at the end of

25

the morning session that I wondered if everyone could
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comment on, sort of a general question about the value

2

of individual anecdotes and studies, a number of which

3

have already been discussed, as compared with or maybe

4

related to what Cliff had referred to as the Holy Grail

5

and what I know Luke, some of his work has suggested is

6

broad policy guidance.

7

I mean, to what extent do folks think we are

8

able to learn enough from individual studies to base

9

policy and priors on versus doing what, say, serious

10

case-by-case analyses in determining the effects on an

11

"as it comes in the door" kind of basis?

12

Anyone?

Professor Scherer?

13

DR. FROEB:

Luke?

I think that the broad aggregate

14

studies suffer from, you know, aggregation bias, and

15

it's very difficult to draw inference from the large

16

down to the small.

17

the small to the large.

18

doing at the FTC have shown that, say, for example, when

19

you're using census data and industry-level studies,

20

you're missing a whole lot that's going on at the

21

individual level, and I think you ultimately learn a lot

22

more by going as narrow and as case-specific as

23

possible.

I think it's much easier to go from
And the studies that we've been

24

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

25

DR. SCHERER:

Mike?

I somewhat disagree.

What's the
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value of anecdotes?

As Zui Griliches used to say, "The

2

plural of anecdote is data."

3

you.

The humor of that escaped

4

DR. WINSTON:

Wasn't it Stigler who said it?

5

DR. SCHERER:

Maybe he learned it from Stigler,

6

I don't know.

7

In any event, you have got to do all this stuff.

8

You have got to do case studies.

9

data.

You have got to do

You have got to integrate all the case studies.

10

All of these things need to be done in order to get

11

something like generalized knowledge.

12

Well, I guess that's all I'll say on that.

13

MR. HEYER:

Jon?

14

DR. BAKER:

Well, my reaction to this and to

15

some of the other comments here is that I think the

16

economics literature has been a little bit -- I have a

17

different perspective, shall I say, on the development

18

of empirical IO, which is that one of the big movements

19

has been away from cross-industry studies, which have

20

all sorts of problems that people here have described,

21

to individual industry studies, where you can learn

22

about -- which effectively control for lots of the

23

differences across the industries.

24

of learning about individual industries.

25

There's been a lot

I'm just thinking of all the studies in Tim
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Bresnahan's IO Handbook chapter, Peter Reiss and Frank

2

Wolak have a recent chapter that surveys a bunch of

3

studies, too, and there is just a wealth of knowledge

4

that -- the unit of observation in empirical IO has

5

shifted from the economy as a whole, across all

6

industries, to individual industries, and we've learned

7

a lot.

8

studies are still done, they are all done largely on

9

related industries, as with the Leonard Weiss book I'm

10
11

Even when those structure-conduct-performance

thinking of from a while back.
You can use what you learn about individual

12

industries too, as I was saying before, to create

13

presumptions about related industries that you can argue

14

about what you know about retailing from retailing

15

industries and how it works.

16

Schmalensee's testimony in Microsoft.

17

about how software markets have certain kinds of

18

competition generally and that that observation probably

19

applies to operating systems.

20

back and says, well, maybe that's an exception.

21

presumption frames the analysis appropriately.

22

I'm thinking of Dean
He was talking

Then the Government comes
The

So, there's a lot you can do with individual

23

industry studies to learn about related industries that

24

I think we're undervaluing here.

25

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

David?
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DR. REITMAN:

I just want to add that I think

2

you have to recognize that Section 2 cases are just

3

distinct from other kinds of antitrust cases in how

4

unique the behaviors are from case to case.

5

hard to generalize from, for example, our merger

6

analysis, which has benefited greatly from being able to

7

go back and forth between cases and theory and getting a

8

body of theory, which can then identify the cases and

9

the time.

10

So, it's

There is so much individuality to any particular

11

set of bundled discounts, where a particular mechanism

12

that a firm predates, it's hard to see that even

13

generalizing from case studies or whatever is going to

14

add a whole lot to the analysis of a particular case,

15

even if it's necessary to some extent for the law.

16

far as the analysis goes of what's going on in a

17

particular industry, I'm not sure how you can use that

18

very well.

19

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

As

David, if I could follow

20

up on that, as you reflect on your experience with the

21

two cases you discussed, and if you were looking ahead

22

to try to extract more general observations from those,

23

is there something about an investigative methodology or

24

an analytical approach that you might derive from those

25

experiences?
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Suppose you were thinking at the time you left

2

the Division about how to leave behind or to make more

3

concrete know-how that you had extracted from your

4

experience analyzing the cases and as a potential

5

testifying expert.

6

would have derived from those that you think would have

7

informed the analysis that you would use in future

8

cases?

9

Are there specific lessons that you

DR. REITMAN:

Well, the clear one I think is

10

from the Dentsply case, that the survey that we did

11

there seems to be fairly rare, at least on this side of

12

the Atlantic, although if you go across to England and

13

Europe, it seems like it's fairly routine as part of a

14

gathering of consumer information to do it

15

systematically through a survey, and the survey really

16

is just that, it's -- instead of interviewing a bunch of

17

customers, it's a way of systematically getting a

18

representative sample and asking the same sorts of

19

questions in a way which could be quantitatively

20

analyzed, and so I think that technique was helpful in

21

Dentsply.

22

monopolization cases.

23

It could be helpful in a lot of

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

Do you have an impression

24

about the arena in which, in many ways, so much of the

25

information we're talking about ultimately has to be
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applied?

2

reject the empirical study that had been done?

3

just an outlier that we're going to encounter when we

4

bring cases?

5

about how to present evidence in a way that ensures that

6

it doesn't simply die at the doorstep of a preliminary

7

motion but makes its way into the resolution of the

8

case?

9

Was the decision of the trial court simply to

10

Is that

Or is there something to be learned there

MR. HEYER:

Objection, calls for a legal

conclusion.

11

DR. REITMAN:

There are certainly things to be

12

learned there about how to actually conduct the survey

13

in order to be able to get through the hurdles of

14

reliability that the Court needs and rightly should

15

require.

16

least in Dentsply, really went beyond that, and so I'm

17

not sure what further lessons, but I do think you can

18

get over that hurdle.

19

in terms of different sides looking at the same evidence

20

and, you know, making different conclusions from it and

21

the Court trying to figure out what to do with it and

22

such that we will have to wrestle with later, but the

23

first hurdle in terms of getting things admissible I

24

think you can overcome.

25

I don't think the analysis in the Court, at

DR. WINSTON:

There may be additional hurdles

I would just -- one thing, and you
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can probably enlighten me on it, the whole discussion is

2

sort of taking place in a political vacuum, you know,

3

it's like antitrust policy proceeds, you know, that we

4

do the analysis right, find out what's going on and

5

bring the case.

6

with a lot of political constraints and, you know,

7

within your department, you know, how you want to frame

8

the case, the kind of people you want to bring in, the

9

cases you want to go after.

10

I mean, obviously all this proceeds

I mean, I think all the things that Mike was

11

saying I agree with completely, that you want to draw on

12

as much evidence as possible, different sources,

13

different people, but all of this is constrained by just

14

political forces within and outside your agencies, and,

15

you know, how you grapple with that ultimately may be as

16

important as any of the analytical things that you

17

solve.

18

MR. HEYER:

19

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

20

Do you want to take this one?
What forces would those

be?

21

One reason that the FTC's anniversaries are

22

interesting to me is that my own appointment is tied to

23

the 26th of September.

24

glass, I have five years before the appointment comes to

25

an end.

As the sands go through the

So, one question for me, given that I have
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1

perhaps a bit more influence in how decisions get made,

2

is how the agency should invest its resources.

3

possibility that Mike referred to before, and it's

4

implicit in the comments that all of you have made, is

5

that one way to begin to use empirical methods to assess

6

the appropriate course in future policy making is to

7

examine past decisions to enforce or not to enforce.

8
9

One

As Mike said before, my first assignment at the
FTC in 1979 was to work with a young Assistant

10

Professor, Tim Bresnahan, in the formulation of the

11

Xerox study.

12

ought to go back and look at completed matters, and for

13

purposes of some public discussion and revelation,

14

should make the results of that process available.

15

That's clearly a sensitive matter and I suppose

16

political in this sense:

17

standard that encourages ex post review in a way that

18

does not raise suspicions that you're picking topics for

19

study or examination simply to show up your predecessors

20

or in some way to reinforce a predilection or set of

21

preferences that you brought to the process?

22

I think in principle that any institution

How do you develop a norm or a

I think we could agree generally that there are

23

tremendous methodological challenges in doing such

24

studies well.

25

insignificant by any means.

I don't put those aside as being
There would be a difficulty
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in implementation.

2

My own preference would be that you would try to

3

develop an internal norm that puts money in the budget

4

every year to do that kind of work -- that is, that some

5

of it be done every year, that there be an expectation

6

such that outside observers would ask every year.

7

matters are you going to look at this year?

8

projects are you going to launch this year?"

9

"What

Which

Second -- you can't model this in a formal way,

10

this is simply a matter of leadership and choice --

11

incumbent leadership would be willing to pick matters

12

that could be sensitive to them.

13

to pick mergers, I would be quite happy to see in the

14

relatively near future (that is, during my time here),

15

an examination of the cruise lines decision.

16

general counsel here when that transaction took place.

17

The FTC and three other jurisdictions studied the cruise

18

lines merger.

19

right.

20

where we intervened and failed, Arch Coal being one.

21

I'd also like to take up the possibility that Jon

22

mentioned, that is at least with respect to the case

23

study component of matters, that there always be an FTC

24

6(b) matter in progress; that is, that it always be part

25

of the research agenda, perhaps with the possibility,

For myself, if I were

I was

I'd like to see if we got the answer

I'd also be interested in taking other matters
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1

again, of using it to examine somewhat more

2

microscopically matters in which the agency intervened

3

and did not intervene.

4

To do that in a way that creates confidence that

5

it is being done in a technically acceptable and

6

even-handed manner requires a great deal of political

7

skill and judgment.

8

evaluation process is perceived internally and

9

externally as being a neutral, truth-seeking exercise

One needs to make sure that the

10

rather than in some sense as a political exercise.

11

That's one thing an agency can commit itself to do.

12

The further question would be, what's the right

13

forum?

Should something be done intramurally?

Should

14

these be partnerships with academic institutions, or

15

think tanks, such as the AEI-Brookings Joint Center on

16

Regulation?

17

research within the university community?

18

the language of international relationships, the

19

modalities for doing this kind of work?

20

be conducted is another issue.

21

way that would be regarded as a neutral, truth-seeking

22

exercise, as opposed to simply an effort to vindicate

23

one's own judgments or to discredit the judgments of

24

one's predecessors is politically a very delicate

25

matter.

Should it be done with specific centers of
What are, in

How it should

To do it well and in a

It would also be a politically delicate matter
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to take one other matter we have mentioned here that's

2

of keen interest to me -- to look at the question of how

3

the antidumping system serves as the punishment

4

mechanism for cartel coordination.

5

a toe in the water in that kind of research work would

6

require a great deal of care to see how warm the water

7

was and to decide in what part of the pool you are going

8

to step in first.

9

think that it's impossible to look at the question of

To even begin to put

As a general matter, I can't help but

10

cartel coordination at home and abroad without

11

accounting for that.

12

DR. FROEB:

Based on the kind of studies we did,

13

you can't learn something from every follow-up study,

14

and I think it's really important to be opportunistic,

15

and I think Mike made a study of the Appellate Court

16

decision overturning the must carry laws provided a

17

really nice natural experiment where we could learn

18

something, and being opportunistic on something like

19

that, it takes a lot of judgment about are we going to

20

be able to learn anything from this?

21

the difficulties of counterfactuals, and I think you

22

have got to be very careful about that.

23

MR. HEYER:

We've talked about

Let me raise another question for

24

folks to talk about that was touched on earlier,

25

particularly Professor Scherer got into it when talking
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about innovation and dominant firms.

2

In trying empirically to get at some of this

3

stuff, the effects of remedies, the performance of

4

dominant firms, I was wondering if there's anything we

5

can usefully do empirically having to do with more

6

long-run issues, incentive issues for firms to become

7

dominant or for firms to be acquired by dominant firms,

8

perhaps?

9

that -- seemed to suggest, at least, and maybe I'm

I think Professor Scherer had suggested

10

reading it wrong -- that maybe the harms from

11

constraining some of the larger firms, at least in the

12

innovation arena, might not be too great, might be worth

13

it, you could get short-run benefits, long-run maybe as

14

well, but we can't tell.

15

I'm wondering if we know anything about long-run

16

effects, whether anything empirically can be done in

17

that area.

18

DR. WINSTON:

Well, there, whatever you do, you

19

are going to have to interface the patent system just in

20

general with technology policy in this country.

21

other words, you know, what you first want to start with

22

is, you know, just positive economics, you know, how is

23

it -- we understand innovation, which is obviously very

24

important and a very difficult thing to do, and layered

25

on top of that is going to be, you know, technology
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policy, and just it does have an influence on that.

2

So, you know, whatever you are going ahead with,

3

you just want to caution yourself that your answers are

4

going to be shaped to a large extent by the

5

institutional environment that exists in this country.

6

DR. SCHERER:

It should be done.

It is really

7

hard.

Obviously the longer time frame you deal with,

8

the more historical artifacts you have to factor in.

9

think the way you get around that is to look at a broad

10

array of cases and try to see how did it work in one

11

case and not work in another case.

12

I

A really interesting one to study, I do not

13

think it has been studied, is the United Shoe Machinery

14

case.

15

shoe machinery, but Judge Wyzanski found them guilty of

16

monopolization around about 1955 or so.

17

interview them in a quite unrelated context in 1958, and

18

they said this was a case where we really had the wrong

19

policy.

20

now, and there were good reasons for not breaking them

21

up, but I am going to leave the Sword of Damocles

22

hanging over their heads.

23

from now and see whether they ought to be divested.

24
25

United was dominant in inventing and developing

I happened to

Wyzanski said I'm not going to break them up

We will come back five years

And so here's USM sitting there with this
possible divestment if they don't get their market

For The Record, Inc.
(301) 870-8025 - www.ftrinc.net - (800) 921-5555

117

1

shares down in the future.

2

They were saying, we're not putting our R&D into shoe

3

machinery.

4

activities.

5

big fast-forward -- what happened eventually was that

6

they became noncompetitive in the shoe machinery

7

business.

8

anyway, Italian firms became the leading suppliers of

9

shoe machinery in the world, and United Shoe Machinery

10
11

So what did I find in 1958?

We're putting it into diversification
And what then happened -- and again, it's a

Italian firms, maybe they would have done so

gradually just declined to nothingness.
We ought to be studying cases where we clearly

12

failed as well as cases where we think we might have

13

succeeded.

14

DR. MULLIN:

And this doesn't give a specific

15

methodology, but some insight might actually come from

16

the kind of, you know, cross-industry comparison or at

17

least looking at the experience of other industries,

18

even ones in which we don't think there's some problems

19

with competition.

20

Stern and Josh Gans have a series of papers about

21

basically licensing in biotech, as they say, licensing

22

the gale of creative destruction.

23

the data, you might think, oh, they are these small

24

people, they are going to come up with something that's

25

going to leapfrog Lilly or something like that, a Lilly

So, for example, you know, Scott

Before you look at
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product, but in actuality, what they will end up doing

2

is end up being acquired through some sort of licensing.

3

Effectively their competitive advantage is innovation

4

and not dealing with regulatory hurdles, et cetera, and

5

it makes more sense for it to be joined with incumbent

6

pharmaceuticals.

7

Now, once again, you might imagine that a

8

different world where Lilly would shrink because it's

9

been leapfrogged by competitors, but by the same token,

10

you know, presumably the current system leads to

11

innovation at the biotech level because they basically

12

know they have got this opt-out in terms of an external

13

capital market.

14

going to be acquired and they don't have to go through

15

the whole costs of taking the drug to market themselves.

16

They know if they get a hit, they are

DR. SCHERER:

Absolutely right.

My daughter is

17

research director of a small biotech startup, and she

18

knows she can't -- if they go into Phase II testing that

19

her firm can't do it.

20

out or be acquired.

21

So, they expect either to license

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

To what extent is the set

22

of institutional arrangements by which agencies actually

23

bring and prosecute cases something that has to be

24

examined as well?

25

of you, have been involved in litigation episodes,

I think that many of you, if not all
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1

either inside the agencies or outside the agencies.

2

was struck at David's comment about how in the course of

3

American Airlines the basic intuition that led to the

4

decision to prosecute remained the same over time, but

5

perhaps the understanding of why it was a good case may

6

have changed in significant respects over time.

7

I

I suppose in any one instance, in deciding to

8

prosecute any one case, the agency not only makes

9

decisions in general terms about whether there's a

10

sustainable theory, but has to make decisions about

11

whether to gather information, what information to

12

present, what is ultimately going to be persuasive to a

13

reviewing tribunal.

14

One element of the equation that we have to

15

consider not simply the functionings of specific firms,

16

industries, and economy as a whole, but the means by

17

which agencies themselves formulate and present cases

18

basically the mechanism by which theories and ideas are

19

ultimately transmitted into specific cases and how those

20

cases are pursued.

21

DR. WINSTON:

22

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

23

questions of institutional capability.

24
25

DR. WINSTON:

I mean -There are larger

And/or institutional constraints.

I mean, there has been some political economy literature
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1

about the role of Congress or, you know, funding sources

2

and how they affect what the agency does.

3

a -- I can't remember, but a while ago, wasn't there a

4

study on -- saying how FTC cases were influenced by

5

Congressional funding in terms of, you know, you weren't

6

going after cases or areas where somebody was high up on

7

a committee in Congress because that could affect your

8

funding?

9

number of years.

There was

That kind of stuff has been around for a

10

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

11

DR. WINSTON:

Yes.

I haven't seen recent work on

12

that, but, you know, there's that kind of political

13

economy reality in terms of your dealings with Congress

14

and the President, of course.

15

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

But I'm saying that, even

16

in the instances where you've decided to go ahead, one

17

key variable is the skill, the shrewdness, with which

18

the institution actually pursues a given matter.

19

DR. SCHERER:

Let me say, my greatest failure.

20

Because I had a long connection with Detroit, when I was

21

director of the Bureau of Economics in the seventies, I

22

put very high priority on beginning an investigation of

23

the automobile industry.

24

for trouble.

25

talked about how -- yeah, Cliff talked about the

Who was it?

It was clear they were headed
I think it was Cliff who
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dynamics that got GM and Ford into their present pickle.

2

Well, it was clear already in the seventies that

3

they were heading for trouble, and the objective of that

4

investigation was not primarily to bring an antitrust

5

case; it was to illuminate to the public and to the

6

Congress what was going on, and the whole thing failed.

7

If we had succeeded, I think we might have avoided some

8

very serious mistakes.

9

some things, the public would have learned some things,

10

The industry might have learned

the Congress would have learned some things.

11

I didn't see that case going into litigation.

12

saw it as performing the FTC's historical role of

13

telling the public what the hell's going on in American

14

industry.

I

15

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

16

DR. BAKER:

Jon?

I was going to add that in the paper

17

I alluded to before with Tim Bresnahan, we talk about

18

two ideas for increasing the institutional capacity of

19

the traditional system to use economic learning, one of

20

which is to think about limited rules for neutral

21

experts, and another is for the enforcement agencies,

22

particularly the economists, to identify and codify

23

relevant generalizations about industries from the

24

empirical economic literature and make that available to

25

courts.
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You all do try to do something sort of like that

2

in Schering, essentially in that whole line of cases

3

where the FTC is effectively relying on the idea that

4

generic drugs, when they enter, the price goes down for

5

the brandeds, and you're thinking "what can we learn

6

from that about the importance of generic entry to

7

create a presumption about why practices that might

8

discourage generic entry would be a problem?"

9

taking generalizations like that and writing reports and

Well,

10

having that available for courts is a way to increase

11

everyone's institutional capacity.

12

DR. SCHERER:

The fact is that the FTC's report

13

on generic drug entry and patent extension strategies by

14

branded drug firms was superb.

15

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

I guess the humbling

16

thing for me is Schering.

17

generic drug study was a major decision of Bob

18

Pitofsky's in 2000 to start the project, handing the

19

baton to Tim Muris, who made a major decision to

20

continue to devote resources and make it a high

21

priority.

22

and an excellent example of how 6(b), which we have

23

talked about before, ought to be part of the

24

Commission's portfolio.

25

The investment in the

I think the study was enormously illuminating

I am not asking everyone to accept the wisdom of
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1

the Schering case on the merits (though I think you

2

should), but you had decades worth of FTC activity in

3

this area, you had the FTC's investment in the empirical

4

study in question, and you had related work that the

5

Commission had done.

6

Court of Appeals, and the FTC received exactly the

7

amount of deference that a wayward child would receive

8

from a parent, which was none at all.

9

the administrative law judge was accorded great

10

All of this was presented to the

The decision of

deference.

11

On the other hand, the decision of the

12

Commission, with this affiliated research, received

13

none.

14

areas of analysis of this type, internally we have to

15

ask, I think, are we bringing to bear the assembled

16

knowledge in an effective way for a reviewing tribunal?

17

You don't get something very far saying, well, that was

18

an error by the Court; there's another erroneous court.

19

Yet another court has failed to get it right.

20

ultimately are the gatekeepers we have to work with.

21

But in this instance, that was unsuccessful in a fairly

22

traumatic way.

23

What is humbling when one walks into difficult

MR. HEYER:

They

One process point that I think might

24

be worth considering, although I'm not quite sure how to

25

get this in front of whoever makes the determination, in
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talking to some international folks, they have a process

2

in some jurisdictions where they actually have the

3

testifying economists, maybe even the consulting

4

economists, the Court essentially has them discuss,

5

debate, reach consensus with one another on things that

6

they can agree on and things that they still disagree

7

on, and to some extent it helps cut through a lot of the

8

confusion that any layperson or court is going to face,

9

and, you know, there are going to be some remaining

10

differences, but that seems like it might be an

11

efficient thing to do, perhaps within the Division or

12

the FTC and perhaps within courts as well, to have that

13

sort of process.

14
15

DR. BAKER:

Let me make a comment.

I want to

advertise something else now, which I was the --

16

MR. HEYER:

It's not another article, is it?

17

DR. BAKER:

No, no Tim Bresnahan on this one.

18

I was co-chair of a task force of the Antitrust

19

Section of the American Bar Association on which Luke

20

participated last year the Economic Evidence Task Force.

21

We did a long analysis of various options like these and

22

laid out some pros and cons.

23

consensus as a task force on it, but I think you would

24

find it very interesting and instructive, and I believe

25

if it is not now it will soon be available on the

We didn't reach a
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Antitrust Section web site for everyone to take a look

2

at.

3

DR. SCHERER:

Actually, I had an experience, I

4

was hired as an expert by Judge Will in Chicago on the

5

glass bottles case.

6

suggested.

7

each side, posed questions that essentially went to

8

their differences, and tried to see what areas of

9

agreement could be found and what new research or what

Part of my task was to do what you

Individually I met with the experts from

10

new analyses could be found that might illuminate the

11

differences.

12

settlement of the case, except that one economist on the

13

final day of testimony strayed from the chosen --

We got pretty close to getting a rational

14

MR. HEYER:

15

DR. SCHERER:

The script?
-- chosen path, and then so turned

16

off the jury, the jury so disbelieved him, that although

17

he was right on the merits, they disbelieved him and

18

rendered a verdict that was totally nonsensical.

19

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

I know we are close to

20

the end of our time for today.

21

closing remarks for the session, but I wanted to give

22

our panelists another minute or so, if you have other

23

thoughts you would like to bring up.

24
25

DR. MARSHALL:

I had a couple of

Well, I just had one comment

about the implied -- well, the suggestion that you had
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implied, Bill, regarding the funding of research

2

programs coming out of either the FTC or the DOJ.

3

not savvy about the political nature of all of that.

4

am generally quite happy with what I see coming out of

5

the academic literature since I am not one to look down

6

at the shoulders I am standing on and speak pejoratively

7

about where I'm resting, but I think that if the DOJ and

8

FTC were to somehow jointly put forward data that was of

9

remarkable quality, you can move research programs that

10

I'm
I

way.

11

The academics will latch into rich sets of

12

quantifiable information and coordinate on that if it is

13

good enough.

14

content in there that they could never get their hands

15

on otherwise, you will move research programs that way,

16

and that doesn't require creating some kind of, you

17

know, NSF-like program within the FTC/DOJ.

If they see that there is lots of economic

18

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

19

(No response.)

20

COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

21

MR. HEYER:

Other closing thoughts?

Ken?

No, I just wanted to thank everyone

22

again.

I learned a good deal, and I know it's not an

23

easy matter to come to something like this, and on

24

behalf of the others as well, I wanted to thank

25

everyone.
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COMMISSIONER KOVACIC:

As Ken did earlier in

2

thanking June, Joe and the team at the Department, I

3

want to thank the folks at the FTC who put this session

4

together.

5

anything, even a discussion around a lunch table, know

6

that this doesn't happen automatically.

7

incredible amount of work by the organizers.

8

Taronji, Pat Schultheiss, Doug Hilleboe, Elizabeth

9

Argeris, and David Balan at the Commission were the

Those of you who have ever organized

This takes an
Jim

10

folks who along with June and Joe, Ken, put this session

11

together.

12

I also want to thank the speakers again.

13

some ways, to ask what we've learned, what we would like

14

to know, and how we go about learning what we like to

15

know are impossibly difficult questions to address in a

16

short period of time.

17

people whose skills were equal to doing the impossibly

18

difficult.

19

thank them for taking their very precious time to share

20

their ideas with us today.

21

In

To do this, we could only ask

That's why this group is here.

I want to

I'm grateful for everyone's willingness to have

22

this session today.

I think that it is truly the

23

marriage of theory and practice that is so important to

24

formulating good policy.

25

dimension, both the broader scale inquiries using the

I think that the empirical
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1

taxonomy that Cliff laid out for us, from the broader

2

economy-wide perspective down to the industry-wide

3

level, to the firm-wide level, down to cases, is a mix

4

that's very important to what we have to do.

5

Perceptions of the past deeply influence current

6

views about what policy should be.

In many ways, they

7

set the presumptions about what policy is today, not

8

just at home but also abroad.

9

opportunities to embed within agencies, and I speak of

There are interesting

10

my own institution, a norm that makes this a routine and

11

significant part of our agenda, every bit as important

12

as bringing the cases; doing the research on which cases

13

rest, looking at past enforcement events or

14

nonenforcement events as a way of considering the way

15

ahead, collaborations with researchers on the outside,

16

maybe the idea, on a limited basis, of regularly

17

convening a workshop at which promising empirical work

18

or promising paths of work are done, something that can

19

be done inexpensively in an illuminating way, and the

20

possibilities that we haven't talked a great deal about,

21

though we have touched upon some, for cross-border

22

comparisons.

23

It's also striking to see the number of academic

24

centers like Bob's, like the joint project that Cliff is

25

so deeply involved in, that have counterparts in Europe
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1

where, week-in and week-out, at different centers,

2

interesting research along these lines are being done,

3

so that what work was done might have a truly

4

cross-border dimension to it.

5

I'm fond of the title that Earl Weaver chose for

6

his autobiography:

It's What You Learn After You Know

7

It All That Really Counts, and that's why continuing

8

attention to doing good empirical work strikes me as a

9

day well spent.

10

Thank you all.

11

(Applause.)

12

(Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., the hearing was

13

concluded.)

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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